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IV. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from summary judgments in favor of both Macris & 
Associates, Inc. ("Macris") and Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), Thomas E. Mower and Leslie 
D. Mower. The appeal presents important issues of successor liability, which no Utah 
appellate court has addressed, and res judicata. Macris therefore respectfully requests 
oral argument. 
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Sections 
78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
VI. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the 
basis of res judicata of Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego 
claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous lawsuit erroneous because these 
claims are different from the breach of contract claims on which Macris prevailed in an 
earlier action? (R. at 276.) In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "this court 
considers 'all of the facts and evidence presented and every reasonable inference 
arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."' Estate of 
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Katzenberqer v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Furthermore, 
because summary judgment presents only questions of law, this Court accords no 
deference to the trial court's ruling and reviews it for correctness. ]dL 
2. Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the 
basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous 
lawsuit erroneous because these claims arose well after the prior suit was commenced 
1 
and after Maoris' last pleading therein? (R. at 274.) The standard of review for this 
issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number 1 above. 
3. Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the 
basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous 
lawsuit erroneous because Neways was not a party to the earlier action and Macris did 
not have a full and fair opportunity in the Images action to present its fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims? (R. at 269-70.) The standard of 
review for this issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number 1 above. 
4. Was the trial court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal on the 
basis of res judicata of Macris' claims for relief beyond that awarded in a previous 
lawsuit erroneous because none of the purposes for the res judicata doctrine are met 
by such ruling, and such purposes were actually thwarted. (R. at 268-69.) The 
standard of review for this issue is the same as the standard of review for issue number 
1 above. 
5. Did the trial court correctly find, on the basis of the uncontroverted facts 
before it, that because "Neways consists of substantially the same assets, products, 
officers, and employees as lmages[, & Attitude, Inc.]," Neways is a "mere continuation" 
of Images and Attitudes, Inc. and is therefore liable under the doctrine of successor 
liability. (R. at 425.) In reviewing grants of summary judgment, an appellate court 
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for 
correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 
1991). However, the appellate court will not consider factual matters raised for the first 
time on appeal. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983). 
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VII. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. 
Schaer v. State. 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
Badger v. Badger. 254 P. 784 (Utah 1927). 
Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert. 
denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW. 
Maoris & Associates, Inc. ("Maoris") commenced this action on February 15, 
1995, against Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), Thomas E. Mower, and his wife, Leslie D. 
Mower, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego. (R. at 
1-12.) On October 19, 1995, Neways and the Mowers filed their motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Maoris' claims were barred by a judgment in a prior lawsuit 
against Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), styled Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & 
Attitude. Inc. etal.. Civil No. 910400358, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County for the State of Utah (hereinafter "Images action"). (R. at 182-83.) In that 
action, Macris was awarded $487,638.87 plus interest on its breach of contract claims 
against Images. (R. at 263.) In this action, on November 14, 1995, Macris filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment on its successor liability claim, arguing that 
Neways was liable to Macris as Images' successor. (R. at 284-85.) The trial court 
partially granted both motions. It ruled that all of Macris' claims for damages beyond 
those awarded in the Images action were precluded. (R. at 422.) The court also ruled 
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that Neways is the successor of Images and is therefore liable for the previous 
judgment against Images. (R. at 422.) 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in August and September, 1992. 
Then, Neways, Inc. ("Neways") was formed and fraudulently succeeded to a multilevel 
marketing operation from Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"). (R. at 10, 11, 35, 171, 
173, 259, 263, 239-40, 291-92, 323-24.) As a result, Macris was compelled to bring 
this lawsuit against Neways and its officers, directors and shareholders, Thomas Mower 
and his wife, Leslie Mower, to recover for obligations owed to it by Images and 
adjudicated by Judge Guy R. Burningham in the Images action. (R. at 1-12.) 
1. The Images Action Arose Out of a 1989 Contract Between 
Macris and Images and Images' Breach of that Contract. 
The multilevel marketing business which was transferred to Neways had as its 
object the sale of health and beauty products. (R. at 416.) Beginning in 1989, Macris 
was a distributor for Images. (R. at 256.) In September, 1989, Images, through its 
founder and president Thomas Mower, and Macris entered into an agreement 
(hereinafter "Autoqualification Agreement") whereby Macris was to be paid at the 
highest level provided for in the operation's marketing plan without having to meet any 
of the usual qualifications for being compensated at such a level. (R. at 31, 258, 259.) 
The amounts owed Macris were based on a portion of the profits of the monthly sales of 
health and beauty products. (R. at 249-51, 258.) The Autoqualification Agreement was 
part of a distributorship agreement between Macris and Images and was to endure 
"through out the life of lmages[ a]s long as [Macris] is [a]ctive in promoting Images and 
Images!' products." (R. at 31.) 
On March 7, 1991, Images inexcusably and unjustifiably breached the 
Autoqualification Agreement by suspending it and later terminating Macris as a 
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distributor. (R. at 251-52.) As a result of this breach, Macris commenced the Images 
action on April 17, 1991. (R. at 214.) On or about June 9, 1992, Macris filed a Second 
Amended Complaint. (R. at 192, 203.) 
In the Images action, all of Macris' claims revolved around two transactions: the 
formation of the Autoqualification Agreement and Images' breach of that contract. (R. 
at 192-214.) The only defendants to the Images action were Images and Thomas 
Mower. (R. at 203.) Neways was not named. Macris alleged that a valid 
distributorship agreement existed between Images and Macris and that Images 
breached that agreement. (R. at 192-203.) Macris sought reinstatement of the 
Autoqualification Agreement, a declaration that Macris was entitled to a continuation of 
such agreement and to sell or convey its distributorship, an accounting, and all 
"damages resulting from termination of the automatic qualification status and of the 
distributorship." (R. at 192-97.) 
On June 6, 1995, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision, ruling in favor 
of Macris. (R. at 134.) The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
September 14, 1995, concluding that Images had materially and unjustifiably breached 
the Autoqualification Agreement. (R. at 251-52, 260, 263.) In calculating damages, 
the trial court awarded Macris "damages for amounts which [Images] should have paid 
to [Macris]. . . from March 1991 through August 1992." (R. at 250.) The court limited 
Macris' recovery to damages incurred through August of 1992 because after that time, 
"Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation." (R. at 250.) The court awarded 
$487,638.87 plus interest. (R. at 263.) This Court affirmed Judge Burningham's 
judgment in Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
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2. During the Images Action, Maoris Suffered Damages as a 
Result of Conduct Wholly Apart from Images1 Breach of the 
Autoqualification Agreement 
Macris also suffered damages other than from Images' breach of the 
Autoqualification Agreement and which was not at issue in the Images action. The 
transfer of the multilevel marking business to Neways involved corporate 
gamesmanship and chicanery and was perpetrated to limit Macris' recovery from 
Images. (R. at 7-8, 11, 35, 173, 239-40, 259, 263, 291-92, 323-24.) Macris also 
suspected that after the September 1, 1992 transfer, Images would be unable to satisfy 
a judgment awarded in the Images action. (R. at 6.) 
More specifically, the September 1, 1992 transfer bore many indications of 
fraud;1 the transfer was made to, at least partially, defeat Macris1 valid claims in the 
Images action; and Neways became a mere continuation of Images. The transfer of 
the multilevel marketing business and other assets from Images to Neways occurred 
after Macris commenced the Images action. In August 1992, Neways was incorporated 
with Thomas Mower as president and his wife, Leslie Mower, as vice-president. (R. at 
11, 173.) In fact, Neways' officers, directors and shareholders were the same members 
of Thomas and Leslie Mowers' family as were also the officers, directors and 
shareholders of Images. (R. at 11, 173, 292, 323-24.) On the eve of the first trial 
setting of September 28, 1992, the newly formed Neways succeeded to Images' 
multilevel marketing business. (R. at 259, 263.) Through this transfer, Neways 
acquired substantially all of the assets, including all tangible assets and inventory, of 
Images. (R. at 10, 35, 173.) All of the distributors in the multilevel marketing business, 
1
 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act lists the following as "badges of fraud": "(a) the transfer or 
obligation was to an insider; . . . (d) before the transfer was made or obligation incurred, the debtor had 
been sued or threatened with suit; [and] (e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets." Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2); Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986). 
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with the exception of Macris, were invited to become distributors under Neways with the 
same rank and position. (R. at 35, 171, 239-40, 291, 323-24.) Also, Neways carried on 
the same business as Images using the same facilities, employees, equipment, 
furnishings and product formulations that Images had used before the transfer. (R. at 
291, 323-24.) Only the name of the business was different. In short, the multilevel 
marketing business was the pea, and Images and Neways were the shells in a shell 
game perpetrated by Neways and the Mowers to defeat Macris' valid claims. 
In their brief, Neways and the Mowers represent that "the majority of the . . . 
shareholders, and officers for Neways and Images are not the same," citing the Affidavit 
of Leslie Mower. (Brief of Appellant at 3.) Nothing in this affidavit, however, refers to 
the shareholders or officers of either Neways or Images. (R. at 351-52.) Moreover, this 
representation contradicts the uncontroverted factual record before the trial court. (R. 
at 292, 323-24, 425.) 
Of course, after the multilevel marketing business took on the new name of 
"Neways," every effort was made during the Images action to erect a wall between 
Images and Neways. (R. at 262.) In the Images action, Images consistently 
maintained that Images and Neways were wholly separate corporations having little or 
no relationship. (R. at 262.) In reality, Neways and Images were essentially the same; 
only the name had been changed to the great detriment of Macris. 
3. To Recover for the Damages Suffered as a Result of the 
September 1992 Transfer of Images' Multilevel Marketing 
Business and Assets to Neways, Macris Instituted the Neways 
Action. 
Macris instituted this action against Neways and Thomas and Leslie Mower on 
February 15, 1995. (R. at 12.) In its Complaint in the Neways action, Macris alleged 
that the multilevel marketing business was still in operation after August of 1992 but 
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only under a different name, and that the name change from "Images" to "Neways" was 
perpetrated to defeat Macris' valid claims. (R. at 7-12.) Macris asserted claims for 
fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-6-5, successor liability and alter ego. (R. at 2-11.) 
Macris' fraudulent transfer claim alleged that Images' transfer of the multilevel 
marketing business to Neways was fraudulent and accomplished to hinder Macris from 
enforcing and collecting the obligation owed by Images. (R. at 7.) Macris sought 
"amounts owed pursuant to a ruling from the court [in the Images action] and any future 
judgment(s) against Images." (R. at 7.) Macris also alleged that the fraudulent transfer 
was carried out willfully, maliciously and intentionally and therefore requested punitive 
damages. (R. at 5.) 
Macris' successor liability claim also arose out of the transactions that were the 
subject of its fraudulent transfer claim. (R. at 3-5.) Macris asserted that Neways' 
business is virtually identical to Images' former business, the multilevel marketing 
operation's name change was done to defeat Macris' judgment and claims, and that 
therefore Neways is the successor corporation to Images. (R. at 4-5.) Macris alleged it 
was entitled to all amounts due from Images. (R. at 4.) 
Also arising out of the August and September 1992 formation of and transfer to 
Neways was Macris' alter ego claim. Macris alleged that Neways is the alter ego of 
Images and that Thomas and Leslie Mower are the alter ego of Neways. (R. at 3.) 
Macris alleged that these entities have wrongfully used the corporate shield of Neways 
to avoid liability to Macris. (R. at 7.) 
For its causes of action based on the August and September 1992 formation of 
and transfer to Neways of Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business, 
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Macris prayed for avoidance of the transfer and monetary damages, including punitive 
damages. (R. at 2.) 
4. Neways and the Mowers Admitted that Macris Could Not Have 
Asserted Its Current Claims During the Images Action. 
Macris could not have brought the causes of action it asserted in the Neways 
action in its pleadings filed in the Images action. The transfer of the multilevel 
marketing business from Images to Neways occurred on the eve of the first trial setting 
in the Images action. (R. at 259, 263.) This was seventeen months after Macris 
commenced the Images action and almost three months after Macris filed its last 
pleading therein. (R. at 192, 214.) Furthermore, the successor to the multilevel 
marketing business, Neways, was never a party to the Images action. Thus, Macris 
was unable to assert its causes of action against it. 
Neways and the Mowers admitted that Macris could not bring its claims against 
them during the Images action. After Macris filed its Complaint in the Neways action 
and during the pendency of the Images action, Neways and the Mowers filed a Motion 
to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings, contending that Macris' causes of 
action against Neways and the Mowers were "Not Ripe for Decision and Therefor [sic] 
Should be Dismissed." (R. at 34 (emphasis in original).) Neways and the Mowers 
argued: 
In the case at bar, [Macris1] claims for Fraudulent Transfer, 
Successor Liability and Alter Ego turn first upon a finding that 
[Images] has a liability to [Macris]. Since the determination has 
not been made, the claims asserted herein have not sharpened 
into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations 
between the parties and as such, the hypothetical application of 
[a rule of law] to a situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves is unripe for adjudication under the 
ripeness doctr ine. . . . 
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Further, continuation of this suit, prior to a final 
determination of liability in [the Images action] would waste 
judicial resources as well as subject the parties to unnecessary 
litigation expenses. 
(R. at 34 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).) In further support of their motion, 
Neways and the Mowers argued that 
[Macris'1 claims for breach of contract are against flmages]. At 
this time, [Maoris'] right to payment against [Images] is being 
considered by this Court. Determination of the merits of [Maoris'] 
claims will establish if there exists an actual or imminent clash of 
legal rights and obligations. It is this determination that will give 
rise to any potential claim [Maoris] may have against Neways. 
at 51-52 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).)2 
5. In Contradiction to What Images, Neways and the Mowers 
Argued and Represented in Both the Images and Neways 
Actions, Neways and the Mowers Asserted a Res Judicata 
Defense, Arguing that Images and Neways Were in Privity 
and Maoris' Claims Could and Should Have Been Brought 
in the Images Action. 
In stark contrast to the arguments they made in their Motion to Dismiss or 
Alternatively Motion to Stay Proceedings, Neways and the Mowers asserted a res 
judicata defense in their Amended Answer3 and, on that basis, moved for summary 
judgment. (R. at 169, 183.) Instead of arguing that Maoris' fraudulent transfer, 
successor liability and alter ego claims were not ripe until after the Images action 
ended, Neways and the Mowers did an about face and argued that these claims should 
have been brought in the Images action. (R. at 223.) 
Also contrary to their prior position, Neways and the Mowers contended that, 
"[f]or purposes of [the] motion only, Neways . . . is in privy [sic] with Images." (R. at 
2
 Neways and the Mowers' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Motion to Stay Proceedings was withdrawn 
on July 10, 1995. (R. at 61.) 
3
 Also in their Amended Answer, however, is the averment that the judgment in the Images action "is not 
binding upon these Defendants." (R. at 172.) 
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225.) In the Images action, Images and Thomas Mower had emphatically denied any 
relationship between Images and Neways. (R. at 262.) This position was critical to 
their strategy of attempting to defeat Macris' valid claims by shifting the multilevel 
marketing business from Images to Neways. In their motion for summary judgment, 
Neways and the Mowers essentially contended that their fervent denials of any 
relationship between Neways and Images was a ruse which Macris was required to foil 
in the Images action or lose the right to seek redress for the damages suffered from 
such gamesmanship. 
Neways and the Mowers now present facts that completely contradict their 
assertions that Neways was in privity with Images. To prove the privity element of their 
res judicata defense to the trial court, Neways and the Mowers admitted that Neways 
was the successor to Images: ,f[i]f Neways is a successor in interest of property that is 
the subject of pending litigation to which his transferor [Images] is bound then Neways 
is entitled to the benefits of res judicata . . . . Images and its alleged successor, 
Neways, are thus protected by the doctrine of res judicata." (R. at 224 (quotations 
omitted) (alteration in original).) Partly on the basis of this admission, Macris moved for 
and the trial court granted summary judgment on Macris' successor liability claim. (R. 
at 285, 425, 427-28.) Neways and the Mowers now assert that Neways is not the 
successor in interest to Images. In their opening appellate brief, they assert that "Eclat, 
Inc. ('Eclat'), not Neways, is the successor company of Images." (Brief of Appellant 
at1.) 
The variety of Neways and the Mowers' statements regarding the relationship 
between Images and Neways and when Macris should have asserted its current claims 
highlights the lengths to which they will go to defeat Macris' valid claims and judgment. 
While Macris could have possibly amended its pleadings in the Images action to join 
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Neways and add its claims against it, Neways and the Mowers insisted that such claims 
were not ripe and their assertion during the Images action "would waste judicial 
resources as well as subject the parties to unnecessary expense." (R. at 34, 52.) 
Following the court's Memorandum Decision in the Images action, however, Neways 
and the Mowers asserted that Macris' current claims should have been included in the 
Images action. (R. at 223.) 
Furthermore, the statements attributable to Neways and the Mowers regarding 
the relationship between Neways and Images have now come full circle. In the Images 
action, they consistently denied any relationship between Images and Neways so that 
they could limit Macris' recovery to damages incurred through August of 1992 and 
evade a judgment against Images. (R. at 262.) In the Neways action, their purpose 
changed, and so their representations regarding the connection between Images and 
Neways changed. They admitted that Neways was the successor to Images to prove 
that the two were in privity. (R. at 224.) Moreover, in their Answer and Amended 
Answer, Neways and the Mowers admitted that Eclat was merely another name for 
Images. (R. at 11, 95, 175.) Now that Macris has moved for and obtained summary 
judgment on its successor liability claim, however, Neways and the Mowers revert to 
the old ploy of erecting barriers between Images and Neways. Now, "Eclat, Inc. 
('Eclat'), not Neways, is the successor company of Images." (Brief of Appellant at 1.) 
6. Despite Neways and the Mowers' Admissions, Inconsistent 
Statements and Inequitable Conduct the Trial Court, to a Great 
Extent Granted Neways and the Mowers' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Both Neways and the Mowers' and Macris* motions for summary judgment were 
orally argued to the trial court on January 22, 1997. (R. at 507, p. 1.) At this hearing, 
the attorney for Neways and the Mowers admitted that Macris' causes of action in the 
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Images action were different than the causes of action it asserted in the Neways action. 
Neways and the Mowers' attorney stated that Macris may present the issue of whether 
the Autoqualification Agreement was breached in the Neways action, but the issue of 
breach would not arise: 
to me, that's a concession that has no meaning because, again, it 
won't be before this Court. 
The issue that will be before this Court is by virtue of 
corporate reorganizations, transfers for consideration^] whether 
or not we, Neways, has [sic] assumed that contract by virtue of 
the fraudulent conveyance statute, or whether or not it's the same 
entity by virtue of some common law theories. 
(R. at 396, 507, pp. 23-24.) 
Despite this and other admissions and Neways and the Mowers' inconsistencies 
regarding Neways' relationship to Images, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision 
on September 19, 1997, granting, to a great extent, Neways and the Mowers' motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 422.) Although the trial court found Neways liable for the 
judgment against Images in the Images action, it granted Neways and the Mowers' 
motion "as to any claim for new damages." (R. at 422.) 
The trial court found that the Images and Neways actions arose "from a single 
breach of a single contract." (R. at 424-25.) It further found that Macris knew about the 
creation of Neways before the conclusion of the previous trial, and should have sought 
to include Neways as a party. (R. at 424.) In doing so, the trial court ignored Macris' 
argument that its claims and damages asserted in the Neways action arose out of the 
August and September 1992 formation of Neways and its succession to Images' assets 
and multilevel marketing business, not Images' breach of the Autoqualification 
Agreement. (R. at 270, 277, 422-25.) The trial court also ignored Macris' argument 
that in the Images action, it was not required to amend its pleadings to include Neways 
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and assert wholly different causes of action for fraudulent transfer, successor liability 
and alter ego. (R. at 271, 272, 274, 422-25, 507, p. 30.) 
With respect to the identity of the parties element of res judicata, the trial court 
found that because Neways was a successor to Images, it was entitled to assert res 
judicata to the same extent as Images. (R. at 427.) The trial court rejected Macris' 
argument that under Utah law, a party may assert the res judicata defense only if the 
claims in the prior lawsuit could have been leveled against such party. (R. at 426-27, 
507, p. 30, 33.) Because Macris' claims in the Images action could only have been 
asserted against Images and its claims in the Neways action could only have been 
asserted against Neways, Utah law prohibits their treatment as in privity with each other 
for purposes of whether Neways can assert the preclusive effect of the judgment in the 
Images action. (R. at 426-27, 507, pp. 30, 33.) 
7. On the Basis of the Uncontroverted Facts Before It the Trial 
Court Found that Neways Was Liable to Macris as Images' 
Successor. 
The trial court did, however, correctly find that Neways was liable as Images' 
successor. (R. at 425.) This finding was made mainly on the basis of the unrefuted 
facts before the court. The court found that 
[i]n early September, 1992, Images transferred substantially all its 
assets to Neways, discontinuing its multilevel marketing business, 
at which time Neways took over the multilevel marketing 
operation, using the same facilities, with the same employees, 
selling the same products through essentially the same network 
of distributors. 
(R. at 431.) These facts were supported by Neways and the Mowers' admissions in the 
Amended Answer and were contained in Macris' statement of facts in its Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 8, 10-11, 171, 172, 173, 174,291-
92.) In responding to Macris' motion, Neways and the Mowers failed to object or 
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otherwise attempt to controvert the facts later relied upon by the trial court. (R. at 323-
24.) 
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ruled that, "as Neways consists of 
substantially the same assets, products, officers and employees as Images, it would 
seem that Neways is in fact a mere continuation of the same corporation" and is 
therefore liable as Images' successor. (R. at 425.) Because of its ruling that res 
judicata bars Macris' claims for "new damages," however, the trial court limited Neways' 
liability to the judgment entered in the Images action. (R. at 422.) 
On November 13, 1997, the trial court signed and entered its order partially 
granting and denying the parties' motions for summary judgment from which both sides 
appeal. (R. at 466-67.) Macris appeals from the part of the order that granted Neways 
and the Mowers' motion for summary judgment that any claim by Macris as to new 
damages beyond those awarded in the Images action is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. (R. at 490.) Macris also appeals the part of the trial court's order denying its 
motion for summary judgment concerning new damages. (R. at 490.) Neways and the 
Mowers, on the other hand, appeal the part of the trial court's order holding Neways 
liable to Macris for the judgment against Images in the Images action. (R. at 460.) 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in finding that res judicata bars any part of Macris' claims in 
this action. First, Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims in 
this action are different from the breach of contract claims it asserted in the Images 
action. In order for res judicata to apply, both lawsuits must involve the same cause of 
action. The claims in the Neways action are different from the claims in the Images 
action because (a) they rest on a different state of facts; (b) they relate to completely 
different time periods; (c) they arise out of completely different transactions; (d) they 
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rely on completely different rights; (e) they seek redress for completely different wrongs; 
(f) a judgment in the Neways action will not impair rights or interests established in the 
Images action; and (g) Macris' claims in the Neways action could not have been 
asserted in the Images action because such claims required the presence of a different 
party. 
Second, Macris was not required to amend its pleadings in the Images action to 
assert its current claims and join new parties or suffer the loss of such claims. It is 
universally held, by both courts and commentators, that the date of filing the pleading 
rather than the date of trial or judgment is the controlling date to determine if claims 
could and should have been asserted, and plaintiffs need not amend filings to include 
issues that arise after the pleadings have been submitted. See citations in Part X.A.2. 
Because Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims did not 
arise until after the Images action was commenced and after its last pleading therein— 
Neways was not even in existence until after these events—res judicata judicata cannot 
bar such claims. 
Third, res judicata is inapplicable because Neways was not a party in the Images 
action and should not be deemed to have been in privity with Images. Utah law 
requires that for a nonparty to assert a judgment entered in a prior action, the party 
against whom the judgment is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity in the 
prior action to litigate the claims it levels against the nonparty. In this case, Images and 
Neways were not in privity because Macris could not have asserted its fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims against Images and therefore did not 
have its day in court on such claims in the Images action. 
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Finally, the policies of judicial economy, fostering reliance on prior decisions, 
preventing inconsistent judgments and avoiding the burden of multiple lawsuits which 
support the doctrine of res judicata would not be furthered by its application against 
Macris in this case. This Court has ruled that where these policies are not advanced, 
res judicata does not apply. In this case, injustice would result from the application of 
res judicata. The true cause of the multiple litigation was the fraudulent transfer of 
Images' assets and multilevel marketing business to Neways. If Neways and the 
Mowers were truly concerned about judicial economy and the avoidance of litigation, 
they would not have forced Images to transfer its assets to Neways. Furthermore, 
Neways and the Mowers would not have taken their initial position in the Newavs action 
that Macris1 current claims were not actionable until the Images action concluded. The 
best way to promote the policies underlying the res judicata doctrine is to remand this 
action to the trial court to allow Macris to seek damages, including punitive damages, 
from Neways and the Mowers for the injuries caused by their attempts to evade liability. 
The trial court was correct, however, in imposing liability upon Neways for 
Images' obligations to Macris. An entity which acquires the assets of a corporation and 
becomes a mere continuation or reincarnation of the corporation's business is liable for 
the corporation's debts. In this case, the trial court found, on the basis of the 
uncontroverted factual record before it, that Neways consisted of "the same assets, 
products, officers, and employees as Images." (R. at 425.) The trial court therefore 
correctly held Neways liable for the judgment against Images under the doctrine of 
successor liability. 
The trial court's only error with respect to its successor liability ruling was in 
limiting Neways' liability to the judgment against Images in the Images action. This 
limitation was based on the trial court's decision that res judicata barred Macris' 
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recovery of damages beyond those awarded in the Images action. For the reasons set 
forth in summary above and more particularly below, this decision was incorrect. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR MACR1S' FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, 
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ALTER EGO CLAIMS AGAINST 
NEWAYS AND THE MOWERS. 
"In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or 
their privies and also the same cause of action." Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 
689, 690 (Utah 1978); see also Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. Josephson, 888 P.2d at 677. Res judicata is intended to "foster[ ] reliance 
on prior adjudication, prevent[ ] inconsistent decisions, reliev[e] parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, and conserv[e] judicial resources." State in the Interest of 
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Res judicata is an affirmative defense 
and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving each and every one of its 
elements. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); see Gossner v. Dairymen Assocs., 611 P.2d 713, 717 
(Utah 1980). 
In this case, res judicata is inapplicable for four reasons. First, Maoris' current 
claims did not arise out of the same cause of action at issue in the Images action. 
Second, Macris was not required to assert its current claims during the Images action 
because those claims did not arise until after the commencement of that action and 
after Macris' last pleading therein. Third, Neways should not be deemed to be in privity 
with Images because the claims asserted in the Neways action could not be asserted 
against Images and the claims asserted in the Images action could not have been 
asserted against Neways. Finally, the res judicata doctrine is inapplicable because its 
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purposes would go completely unfulfilled in this case and would actually be frustrated. 
The trial court therefore erred in holding that the doctrine of res judicata barred any part 
of Maoris' claims in this case.4 
1. Macris' Claims in the Newavs Action Are Not Part of the Same 
Causes of Action on Which Maoris Prevailed in the Images 
Action. 
Under Utah law, res judicata may apply only if the causes of action in the current 
and previous lawsuits are identical: "'[iln order for res judicata to apply, both suits must 
involve . . . the same cause of action.'" Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 
1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting Searle, 588 P.2d at 690); see also Copper State 
Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same). "Where the 
claim, demand, or cause of action is different in the two cases, then collateral estoppel 
is applicable." \±'} see Searle 588 P.2d at 690; Josephson, 888 P.2d at 677; Berry v. 
Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). If the claims, demands or causes of 
action differ in the two actions, the claims in the second action cannot be said to be 
ones that could and should have been litigated in the first action. See Schaer, 657 
P.2d at 1340 n.2 (ruling that "before the rules enunciated in the Krofcheck [v. Downey 
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1978)] case [including that res judicata bars 
claims that could and should have been raised in the first action] may be applied, the 
appellants must first overcome the threshold determination of whether the claims, 
demands or causes of action of both cases are the same."); see also Doe v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1993); Macko v. Byron, 555 F. Supp. 470, 479 
(N.D. Ohio 1982); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment h (1982); 18 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4406 (1981). 
4
 Macris does not contend that the Images action did not result in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Various tests have been advanced to determine if a cause of action is the same 
as one asserted in a prior action. In Schaer v. State, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
res judicata was inapplicable where 
[t]he two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and 
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain 
the two causes of action[, and where] the evidence of the two 
causes of action relates to the status of the property in two 
completely different time periods. 
Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340. Another test asks "what was the critical transaction in each 
case" and compares such transactions. Doe, 985 F.2d at 914 (7th Cir. 1993); cX Utah 
R. Civ. P. 13(a) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim . . . if it arises out of 
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's 
claim. . . . " ) . Other considerations include: 
Is the same right infringed by the same wrong? Would a different 
judgment obtained in a second action impair rights under the first 
judgment. . . . This court has recognized that the principal test for 
comparing causes of action is whether the primary right and duty 
or wrong are the same. 
Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Julien J. 
Studlev. Inc. v. Lefrak, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907-08 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 401 N.E.2d 
187 (N.Y. 1979); Peppery. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 152 (Utah 1990); 
Nancy's Prod., Inc. v. Fred Meyer, Inc.. 811 P.2d 250, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
Finally, a cause of action must differ from one asserted in a prior action if it 
requires a different party for the claimant to obtain relief. Most courts and 
commentators maintain that "the claim or cause of action in a suit against one party is 
not the same as a claim or cause of action against a different party." 1B James W. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ^ 0.411[1] (2d ed. 1996); see New Crawford Valley, 
Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Colo. App. 1993). Thus, it stands to reason that 
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a cause of action which requires the presence of a party not present in the first suit 
must be a different cause of action. A similar conclusion was reached by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals in Qualitv-Med, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Hospital and Medical Service, 
914 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1995). There, the court ruled that there was no identity of 
claims for relief in the first and second actions because the claims for relief in the first 
action could be asserted only against a party not involved in the second action. \_± at 
420-21. 
In this case, consideration of each and every criterion listed above leads to the 
conclusion that Maoris' claims in the Neways action are different from its claims in the 
Images action. First, the test applied in Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 
1983), favors finding the claims different. "The two causes of action rest on a different 
state of facts and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the 
two causes of action. Moreover, the evidence of the two causes of action relates to . . . 
two completely different time periods." jd. The Images action arose out of the 1989 
formation and Images' March 7, 1991 breach of the Autoqualification Agreement. In 
that action, Macris and Images litigated whether a valid agreement existed between 
Macris and Images, whether Images breached that agreement and whether such 
breach was excusable or justified. 
In contrast, the Neways action arose out of the formation of Neways and Images' 
September 1, 1992 transfer of its assets, including the multilevel marketing business, to 
the new corporation. This action will deal with the formation of Neways, the relationship 
between Images and Neways, the circumstances around which Images' multilevel 
marketing business and other assets were transferred to Neways, and Neways' 
operation of the multilevel marketing business. As Neways and the Mowers admitted 
during the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the Autoqualification 
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Agreement "won't be before this Court. The issue that will be before this Court is by 
virtue of corporate reorganizations, transfers for consideration^] whether or not we, 
Neways, has [sic] assumed [liability] by virtue of the fraudulent conveyance statute, or 
whether or not it's the same entity by virtue of some common law theories." (R. at 396, 
507, pp. 23-24.) 
Also, "the critical transaction^] in each case" are different. Doe, 985 F.2d at 
914; c/f Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). In the Images action, the critical transactions were the 
1989 establishment of the Autoqualification Agreement as part of the distributorship 
agreement and its 1991 breach. In the Neways action, however, the critical 
transactions are the formation of Neways and the transfer of Images' assets, including 
the multilevel marketing business, to Neways in August and September of 1992. Under 
the transactional test, the causes of action in the Images action and the causes of 
action in the Neways action are different. 
Other considerations also favor a finding that the causes of action are different. 
The right asserted in the Images action, the right to rely on a valid contract, is not "[t]he 
same right" on which the Neways action was based. See Kemp, 608 F.2d at 1052. In 
the Neways action, Macris bases its claims on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and 
similar common law doctrines which protect creditors from the "artifices and evasions" 
of debtors. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). 
Also, the wrong for which redress was sought and awarded in the Images action 
is not the same wrong for which redress is sought in the instant action. See Kemp, 608 
F.2d at 1052. The wrong asserted in the Images action was Images' breach of the 
Autoqualification Agreement and distributorship agreement. The wrong asserted in the 
Neways action, however, is the fraudulent transfer of, and Neways' succession to, the 
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multilevel marketing business and assets of Images accomplished to defeat Maoris' 
valid claims and judgment in the Images action. 
Furthermore, the two actions are not so similar that a different judgment in the 
second action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first. Id.; 
see also Pepper, 801 P.2d at 152 (Utah 1990) (holding claim not barred by res judicata 
partly because claim "does not constitute a collateral attack on [the prior] order."). The 
only rights or interests established in the Images action were Maoris' termination of 
Macris' rights to damages flowing from Images' breach of the Autoqualification 
Agreement and termination of Macris' distributorship. These rights cannot be impaired 
even if the fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims fail. Actually, 
Macris' rights and interests established in the Images action would be impaired if its 
current claims are barred. If such claims are held to be barred, Images, Neways and 
the Mowers' strategy of defeating Macris' valid claims and judgment through evasion 
and guile will have succeeded. 
Finally, the causes of action in the Images and Neways actions must differ 
because Macris could not have obtained relief on its current claims in the Images 
action. Rather, the only way Macris can prevail on its fraudulent transfer, successor 
liability and alter ego claims is by asserting them against the transferee, the successor 
and the alter ego, Neways; not the empty shell of Images. Because Neways was not a 
party in the Images action, these claims could not have been asserted. Thus, they are 
different from the breach of contract claims that actually were asserted. 
This same conclusion regarding the identity of breach of contract claims and 
later arising fraudulent transfer and successor liability claims has been reached by other 
courts. For example, in Magic Valley Radiology v. Kolouch, 849 P.2d 107 (Idaho 1993), 
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the Idaho Supreme Court held that a judgment on a plaintiffs breach of contract cause 
of action did not bar the plaintiffs fraudulent transfer, director liability and successor 
liability claims: 
None of these claims arise out of the transaction that was the 
subject of [the prior lawsuits]. These claims address transactions 
that are alleged to have occurred after the alleged breach of the 
contractual arrangement that was the subject of the first case. . . . 
[I]t is clear that the issues raised by [the plaintiffs] claims for 
fraudulent transfers, for director liability, and for continuation of 
business, were not decided in the prior case. That case focused 
on the conduct of [the defendants] in breaching the contractual 
arrangement.... 
IdL at 112. 
In Julien J. Studlev. Inc. v. Lefrak. 412 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 401 
N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1979), the New York courts held that the plaintiffs prior breach of 
contract action against the defendant did not bar its later suit against the defendant for 
fraudulent transfer: 
The prior litigation established the debts owing to [the plaintiff] 
from the corporations . . . . 
In this litigation the enforcement of the judgments against 
corporate assets is the issue, and [the defendant] is sued 
because he is one of the transferees of those corporate assets. 
Hence, the gist of the two litigations is not the same and, clearly, 
the claims of the parties rest on different aspects of the 
transactions between the corporations and [the defendant]. 
Though in the first action [the plaintiff] could have sought to 
establish its debt and set aside the transfer at once, it chose not 
to do so, and it may not be faulted for the choice. The judgment 
in this litigation will not "destroy or impair rights or interests 
established by the first." 
Id. at 904, 907-08 (emphasis added) (quoting Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberq Realty 
Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307); Lefrak. 401 N.E.2d at 188. 
Like the fraudulent transfer and successor liability claims in Magic Valley 
Radiology and Lefrak, Maoris' claims in the Newavs action did not arise out of the 
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breach of contract causes of action asserted in the Images action. The gist of the two 
litigations is not the same, and therefore res judicata is inapplicable. 
In their opening brief, Neways and the Mowers argue that Maoris1 successor 
liability claim should have been asserted in the Images action because "if a plaintiff has 
knowledge of the facts to support a claim against a defendant or the defendant's privy, 
the doctrine [of] res judicata requires that the plaintiff bring these claims in the existing 
action." (Brief of Appellant at 14.) Neways and the Mowers could not be more wrong. 
The doctrine of res judicata does not impose upon plaintiffs a rule 
requiring the mandatory joinder of claims. The doctrine merely 
calls upon a party to present all of his proof and assert all of his 
theories of recovery . . . when litigating a claim, as he will be 
prevented from doing so thereafter. The doctrine does not, as 
defendants assert, require a plaintiff to join in one action all of the 
separate causes of action which he may have against a particular 
defendant. 
Macko, 555 F. Supp. at 479 (emphasis added); see also Doe, 985 F.2d at 931 ("[EJven 
if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis for a suit at the filing of another suit, he or she 
is not obligated to bring all claims together if they do not arise out of the same 
transaction."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment h (1982) ("There is 
no . . . compulsion on a plaintiff who has a number of claims against a defendant to join 
them in a single action; he may join them if he wishes, but he is not obliged to do so out 
of fear that he will lose any claims he omits to join. Joinder of multiple claims is 
permissive, not compulsory."); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 4406 (1981) (same). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
before consideration of whether subsequent claims could and should have been raised 
in a prior action, "the appellants must first overcome the threshold determination of 
whether the claims, demands or causes of action of both cases are the same." Schaer, 
657 P.2d at 1340 n.2; Krofcheck. 580 P.2d at 244. 
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Despite Neways and the Mowers1 assertions, Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), does not stand for a contrary rule. In Masters v. Worslev, the first 
action was a divorce proceeding in which Worsley was awarded custody of the children, 
and Masters was ordered to pay child support. During that action, Worsley falsely 
denied having had an amorous affair during the marriage. Following such false denial, 
Masters discovered the truth of the matter and that some of the children may have been 
fathered by Worsley's paramour. Masters filed an action for fraud, challenging the 
divorce court's award of child support. \_± at 500, 501. 
Despite the fact that a challenge to the obligation of child support was or could 
have been litigated in the divorce proceeding, this Court found that res judicata, or 
claim preclusion, was inapplicable. ]cL at 509. The Court's basis for this holding was 
not, as argued by Neways and the Mowers, solely that Masters had no knowledge of 
the facts supporting the fraud claim. This Court also found that the issues surrounding 
the fraud action were different from the issues litigated in the divorce proceedings: 
"Claim preclusion does not bar Masters's fraud claim because the issues have not been 
fully litigated in either the original divorce nor the petition for modification proceedings." 
Id. at 503. Masters v. Worslev is yet another case in a long line of Utah decisions 
holding that res judicata does not preclude a cause of action that is different from one 
asserted in a prior suit. Thus, it is not true, as Neways and the Mowers assert, that 
Macris was required to assert each and every separate cause of action it had during the 
Images action. As discussed above, Macris' claims in the Neways action are different 
from its claims in the Images action, and res judicata therefore cannot apply. 
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2. Macris Was Not Required to Amend Its Complaint in the 
Images Action to Assert Its Current Claims Because Such 
Claims Did Not Arise Until After the Commencement of that 
Action and After Macris' Last Pleading Therein. 
In order for res judicata to preclude the assertion of a subsequent cause of 
action, not only must the cause of action be identical to one brought in the prior suit, but 
the party sought to be barred must also have been aware of the cause of action at the 
time the first suit was commenced or the filing of the party's last pleading therein. 
Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1993); Manning v. City of Auburn, 
953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992); Prime Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 
F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1990); Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 
57, 62 (2d Cir. 1989); Petromanagement Corp. v. Acme-Thomas Joint Venture, 835 
F.2d 1329, 1336 (10th Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified 
School Dist. 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); 
Green v. Illinois Dept. of Transp.. 609 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (N.D. III. 1985); Whitley 
Constr. Co. v. Whitley, 213 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Bolte v. Aits, Inc., 587 
P.2d 810, 812-13 (Haw. 1978); Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 
149 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); Whitaker v. Bank of Newport, 836 P.2d 695, 699 (Or. 1992) 
(in banc); Ben C. Jones & Co. v. Gammel-Statesman Publishing Co.. 99 S.W. 701, 703 
(Tex. 1907); Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Ctr., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App. 
1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, comment d (1982); 18 Charles A. 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4409 (1981). The rule has been stated 
as follows: 
[W]e do not believe that the res judicata preclusion of claims that 
"could have been brought" in earlier litigation includes claims 
which arise after the original pleading is filed in the earlier 
litigation. Instead we believe that, for res judicata purposes, 
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claims that "could have been brought" are claims in existence at 
the time the original complaint is filed or claims actually asserted 
by supplemental pleadings or otherwise in the earlier action. 
Manning, 953 F.2d at 1360 (emphasis in original); see also Whitaker, 836 P.2d at 699 
("Obviously, enough events to give rise to the second claim must have occurred before 
the first claim is brought so that the party against whom preclusion is asserted could 
have combined his or her claims with the earlier ones." (emphasis in original)); Kaiser 
587 S.W.2d at 457 ("[T]he date of filing the pleading rather than the date of trial or 
judgment is controlling."); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 4409 (1981) ("The rules that expand the dimensions of a cause of action as time goes 
on require clear identification of a stopping point. Most cases assume that an action 
need only include the portions of the claim due at the time of commencing that action.") 
Thus, "plaintiffs need not amend filings to include issues that arise after the original suit 
is lodged." Doe, 985 F.2d at 915; see also Whitley, 213 S.E.2d at 911 ("The fact that 
[procedural rules] contain[ ] liberal provisions making it possible to amend the pleadings 
during the course of the trial [does] not require the plaintiff to so amend in every case in 
which he might amend. . . . It is more practicable to have a certain cutoff time 
(emphases in original)). 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this rule long ago in Badger v. Badger, 254 P. 
784, 787 (Utah 1927). In that case, the defendant twice petitioned for a modification of 
a decree of divorce. Her first petition sought modification on the ground that the 
property settlement on which the decree was based was induced by the plaintiffs false 
representations and omissions regarding his assets. The court modified the decree, 
ordering plaintiff to pay the defendant an additional amount. The defendant filed her 
second petition alleging that the plaintiff further misrepresented his assets. The plaintiff 
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moved to strike the petition on the grounds that the court's decision on the defendant's 
first petition barred relief on her second, and the trial court granted the motion. kL at 
785-86. 
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the court recited the general rule against 
splitting one's cause of action: " I f . . . the pleader is in possession of the means of 
ascertaining the full extent of his claim, and his failure to do so is due to his own fault or 
neglect, it would seem that upon both principle and authority the general rule against 
splitting applies." jcL at 787. In its analysis, however, the court made clear that for res 
judicata to apply, the pleader must have the ability to ascertain the full extent of his 
claim "at the time the first petition was filed." Id. (emphasis added). The court found 
that the general rule against claim splitting applied because 
[i]t affirmatively is made to appear that at the time the first petition 
was filed for a modification of the decree of divorce the defendant 
knew the contents of said decree and that she was to receive no 
property except that actually awarded to her. . . . [T]he 
[defendant] had as much knowledge about the plaintiffs property 
and income at the time she filed her first petition as she had at 
the time she filed the amended petition which was stricken. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Court also emphasized that "[n]owhere in the amended 
petition is there any allegation to the effect that she was not fully advised of matters 
complained of by her in such amended petition at the time she filed her first petition for 
an amendment of the decree of divorce." kL at 786, 787 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Utah Supreme Court has decided that an action need include only the portions of a 
cause of action that have arisen at the time that action was commenced. \j± at 786, 
787. 
This rule is echoed in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13(a) defines a 
counterclaim that must be asserted or be barred in another action as "any claim which 
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at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party 
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Utah law treats the time that the earlier 
suit was commenced or the filing of the party's last pleading therein as the time by 
which to determine if the party could and should have asserted a claim in that suit. 
Contrary to Neways and the Mowers' contentions, Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), does not stand for the proposition 
that if a plaintiff learns of facts after the commencement of an action that give rise to a 
claim, he is required to amend his pleadings to assert such claim. In Ringwood, the 
plaintiff was barred from bringing a second action on a claim for breach of contract that 
arose before the first action was commenced. The plaintiff filed his first lawsuit on 
January 29, 1980, claiming the defendants had breached an October 1978 promissory 
note. kL at 1353. Because the plaintiff did not base his claim on a November 8, 1978 
agreement, which the court found controlling, the court dismissed his claim, i d The 
second action asserted breach of the November 8, 1978 agreement. JdL Because 
plaintiff knew of the November 8, 1978 agreement and the breach before his 
January 29, 1980 lawsuit, his second action was dismissed. \± at 1358. Thus, nothing 
in this case runs contrary to the rule adopted in Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Badger v. Badger, and the majority of cases and commentators that an 
action need include onJy the portions of a cause of action that have arisen at the time 
the action was commenced or at the time of the party's last pleading in that action. 
This rule is grounded in good sense. Any alternative time for evaluating whether 
a claim is precluded could lead to unfairness. 
Substantial disruption could result from forced amendment at any 
time after significant discovery has been accomplished, and it is 
hard to justify any test relating to the progress of discovery or 
other pretrial events so clear that plaintiffs could afford to apply it 
without seeking explicit judicial guidance. 
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18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4409 (1981); see also 
Doe, 985 F.2d at 915 ("We would twist res judicata grotesquely out of shape by holding 
that a plaintiff must include not only all claims arising from the same transaction, but 
must anticipate future harms . . . ) ; Manning, 953 F.2d at 1360 (holding that the rule that 
a lawsuit need only include claims that have arisen at time of commencement "avoids 
the 'potentially unworkable requirement that every claim arising prior to entry of a final 
decree must be brought into the pending litigation or lost.'" (quoting Los Angeles 
Branch NAACP. 750 F.2d at 739 n.9). 
In this case, the trial court erred by dismissing Maoris' fraudulent transfer, 
successor liability and alter ego claims for relief beyond that awarded in the Images 
action because such claims arose after the commencement of the Images action and 
after Macris' last pleadings therein. Macris commenced the Images action on April 17, 
1991. On June 9, 1992, Macris filed its Second Amended Complaint, its last pleading 
in that suit. It is uncontroverted that Neways did not even exist before August of 1992, 
and Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business, were transferred to 
Neways in September, 1992. Until these events, Macris could not assert its current 
claims. Even then, Macris would require time to discover the totality of facts giving rise 
to the fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims. As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals explained with respect to a similar type of claim: 
it is not enough that a party knows it might have a basis to sue 
to pierce the corporate veil at the time it brings an action against 
a corporation. Any time a party conducts business with a closely 
held corporation, that party is aware that the corporate principal 
with whom the party deals might be the alter ego of that 
corporation. Such knowledge is insufficient, however, for res 
judicata to bar that party from bringing a subsequent action to 
pierce the corporate veil. 
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Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 150 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 11 which requires that "a pleading be well grounded in fact" and stating 
that under Rule 11 "mere 'suspicion,' 'without factual foundation' is not a sufficient basis 
to sue an individual."); Whitley Constr. Co.. 213 S.E.2d at 911 ("[l]t must also be 
remembered that [a new claim] also requires the requisite p roo f . . . . It is more 
practicable to have a certain cutoff time . . . ."). Thus, even after Neways' formation and 
succession to Images' business and assets, Macris' current claims were not 
immediately ripe for assertion. Because Macris was not required to amend its 
pleadings in the Images action to include the new claims or suffer their loss, the trial 
court erred in holding them barred by res judicata. 
3. For Res Judicata Purposes, Neways Should Not Be Deemed 
to Be in Privity with Images: Macris Did Not Have a Full and 
Fair Opportunity in the Images Action to Litigate Its Current 
Claims Because Such Claims Could Not Be Asserted Against 
Images. 
It is undisputed that for res judicata to apply in this case, Neways must be 
deemed Images' privy because it was not a party in the Images action. (Brief of 
Appellant at 9.) The concept of privity, however, has never been precisely defined. 
Various courts have commented that "[pjrivity is essentially a conclusory term that 
describes the relationship between a party and a non-party that is deemed close 
enough to warrant the application of claim or issue preclusion to the non-party." Ditton 
v. Bowerman. 844 P.2d 919, 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Motion Picture Indus. Pension 
Plan v. Hawaii Kona Coast Assocs., 823 P.2d 752, 757 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) ("The 
concept of privity has moved . . . to merely a word used to say that the relationship 
between the one who is a party of record and another is close enough to include that 
other within the res ajudicata [sic]." (internal quotes omitted)). What is clear is that the 
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privity concept is inextricably connected with the basic concern that "[t]he party barred 
from litigating a claim in a subsequent action must have had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the same claim in the prior case." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 
913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure §4448 (1982). 
This concept is embodied in the Utah Supreme Court's and this Court's 
discussions of the identity of parties requirement of res judicata and the concept of 
privity. In International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979), the court 
stated that the identity of parties requirement of res judicata was founded on the 
concept that those barred by a prior action must have had an opportunity to assert its 
claims in that action: 
One of the reasons that it is said that the parties must have been 
the same in both actions is that before the rights of a party are 
concluded by a judgment, he is entitled to due process of law and 
an opportunity to contest the issue if he so desires. 
Id. at 517. Also, in determining whether an entity should be deemed in privity with a 
party for res judicata purposes, Utah courts "resolve[ ] all doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." Baxter v. Utah Dept. 
ofTransp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1985); Ruffinenqo v. Miller. 579 P.2d 342, 344 
(Utah 1978). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has held that those whose only 
connections with previous actions were as witnesses or were shared legal rights with 
those who were parties are not in privity with parties to such action. Baxter, 705 P.2d at 
1169; Ruffinenqo, 579 P.2d at 344. This is also why the Utah Supreme Court has 
defined a person in privity as a representative of a party: "a person so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). The "ability to control representation of rights is 
33 
'necessary to fulfill the function of privity to provide a day in court."' State in the Interest 
ofT.J., 945 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Ruscetta. 742 P.2d 
114, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Viewed in light of its '"function . . . to provide a day in court,"1 j d , it is apparent 
that the test of privity depends on whether a nonparty is sought to be bound by a 
previous judgment or whether the nonparty is seeking to take advantage of it. 
The question whether a nonparty may take advantage of a 
judgment is now approached by most courts from a very different 
perspective than the question whether a party may be bound.. . . 
Once it is concluded that preclusion is asserted against a person 
who may be bound by the judgment, the inquiry shifts to ask 
whether there is some special reason for denying its benefits to a 
nonparty. Denial is most likely to rest on a broad conclusion that 
the first litigation did not afford a "full and fair opportunity" to try 
the issue offered for preclusion. 
18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448 (1982). When the 
issue is whether a nonparty should be bound as one in privity, the test is whether it had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior action by virtue of some 
control or representation in that action. Baxter, 705 P.2d at 1169; Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d 
at 344; State in Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d at 162-63; Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at 117. 
Moreover, the analysis is performed irrespective of whether the nonparty had the 
opportunity to intervene in the prior action. Searle Bros., 588 P.2d at 692 ("The right to 
intervene as a party in the prior suit does not bind the party in the subsequent suit 
where he failed to so intervene."). 
The test of privity to determine if a nonparty may take advantage of a prior 
judgment and preclude a party must also be applied with a view of "resolving doubts in 
favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." 
Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d at 344. Therefore, the test of privity in this situation is whether 
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the party "had the 'full and fair opportunity' it is entitled to for an adjudication" on its later 
asserted claims. Dunfield, 599 P.2d at 517; see also Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 
P.2d at 733; Gossner v. Dairymen Assocs., 611 P.2d 713, 716-17 (Utah 1980). 
Moreover, just as a nonparty is not required to intervene, the "identity of parties" 
analysis with respect to whether a nonparty may take advantage of a judgment must be 
applied irrespective of whether the party could have amended its pleadings to join the 
nonparty. Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Utah 1987) 
(rejecting argument that "res judicata should bar plaintiffs suit against respondent 
because plaintiff could have amended her complaint in the original action to join 
respondent as a defendant. Plaintiffs failure . . . cannot bar the action."); Gossner, 611 
P.2d at 716-17, 719 (rejecting dissent's argument that the identity of parties prong of 
res judicata is met because in the original action, the nonparty should have been 
joined). Thus, before a nonparty can assert the preclusive effect of a prior judgment, 
the party must have had its day in court on the merits of the claims against the nonparty 
even though the nonparty was not present. 
In this case, a nonparty, Neways, seeks to take advantage of the judgment in 
Maoris' favor in the Images action. Therefore, to ensure that Macris has had its day in 
court on its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims, the test of privity 
is whether Macris had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims during the 
Images action. In other words, when Macris litigated its claims against Images in the 
Images action, it must have also been litigating its fraudulent transfer, successor liability 
and alter ego claims. Clearly, Macris did not. Such claims can only be asserted 
against the transferee, the successor and the alter ego, Neways. Because Macris has 
not had its day in court with respect to these claims, Neways must not be held to be in 
privity with Images, and the trial court erred in holding that it was. 
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The trial court's privity analysis deprived Macris of a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate its current claims. First, the trial court found that if "Neways is a successor in 
interest of property that is the subject of pending litigation to which his transferor is 
bound then the transferee is" in privity with the transferor. (R. at 427.) Then, the trial 
court held that "as Neways is the successor in interest of property that Images would 
have used to pay damages to Macris, Neways is entitled to argue res judicata to the 
same extent as Images." (R. at 427.) The problem with the trial court's analysis is that 
it applied an inapplicable test of privity and then skewed the test to reach its result. 
The test applied by the trial court is inapplicable because property was not the 
subject of the litigation in the Images action. The subject of the Images action was the 
formation of the Autoqualification Agreement and Images' breach of that contract. The 
fact that, as the trial court reasoned, property "would have [been] used to pay damages 
to Macris" does not make it the subject of the Images action. Otherwise, every action 
for damages becomes a property dispute. 
The purpose of this test of privity makes clear that it would be unfair to apply it in 
this case. In the case of a nonparty successor to property seeking to take advantage of 
a prior judgment, the purpose is to provide repose with respect to the adjudicated status 
of property. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1980). In such a case, 
preclusion is justified because the claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
status of the property. In the case of a nonparty successor who is sought to be bound 
by a prior judgment 
[t]he compelling need for this rule is apparent. To deny 
preclusion would be to deny the victor any assurance of repose 
and expose every judgment to defeat by simple conveyance. 
18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4462 (1981); see also 
Golden State Bottling Co.. Inc. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973) ("We hold that a 
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bona fide purchaser, acquiring, with knowledge that the wrong remains unremedied, the 
employing enterprise which was the locus of the unfair labor practice, may be 
considered in privity with its predecessor. . . ."). In this case, the Images action was 
unconcerned with the status of property, and it would be unfair to preclude Macris from 
asserting completely different claims as if the Images action had been concerned with 
the status of property. Macris has not had its day in court on its current claims. 
Moreover, the test applied in this case would defeat its dual purpose to prevent the type 
of evasion perpetrated by Neways and the Mowers in this case. Thus, the trial court 
erred in applying a successive property interest test of privity and finding that, under 
such test, Neways was in privity with Images.5 
4. Res Judicata Is Inapplicable in this Case Because the Policies 
Underlying the Res Judicata Doctrine Would Not Be Furthered, 
and Would Actually Be Frustrated. 
The purposes of res judicata are defined as "fostering reliance on prior 
adjudications], preventing inconsistent decisions, relieving parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits and conserving judicial resources." State in the Interest of 
J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations omitted). In Estate v. 
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1995), this Court held that if these justifications are not present in an action 
"neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precludes the . . . action." \_± at 678. 
Furthermore, res judicata is an equitable doctrine, and it should not be applied where it 
5
 The trial court also erred in assuming, without any basis or argument from Neways or the Mowers, that 
Thomas and Leslie Mower were in privity with Images. "[F]or purposes of the doctrine of res judicata, a 
corporation is treated as a legal entity separate from and independent of its officers, directors and 
stockholders. Therefore, a judgment against a corporation will not preclude the assertion of claims 
against that corporation's directors [or stockholders]. . . ." New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 
P.2d 1363, 1368 (Colo. App. 1993); Ditton v. Bowerman, 844 P.2d 919, 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Durrant 
v. Quality First Mktg, Inc., 903 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). 
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would be inequitable to do so. Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 630 F.2d 
864, 875 (1st Cir. 1980); Sweetheart Plastics v. Illinois Tool Works. 439 F.2d 871 (1st 
Cir. 1971); Boltev. Aits. Inc., 587 P.2d 810, 814 (Haw. 1978); Pepper v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank. N.A.. 801 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1990); 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice fl 0.405[12] (1996). This is especially so where the issue is whether the 
plaintiff, which prevailed in the prior suit, is attempting to split its cause of action rather 
than relitigate it. Bolte. 587 P.2d at 814 ("The rule against splitting should not be so 
rigidly applied . . . to produce injustice and thwart the policy upon which it was founded." 
1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ]J 0.405[12] ("In cases involving the 
splitting of a cause of action, there is a certain amount of flexibility . . . and the decisions 
in this context show, perhaps, less rigidity.") 
First, application of res judicata in this case would not foster reliance on the 
adjudication of the images action. To the contrary, application of res judicata would 
defeat such reliance. In the Images action, Macris prevailed on its breach of contract 
causes of action and was awarded a substantial sum. If res judicata is applied in this 
case, Neways and the Mowers' artifice and evasion will defeat Macris' judgment as well 
as other damages Macris suffered as a result of their fraud. Thus, in order to foster 
reliance on the adjudication in the Images action, this Court should hold res judicata 
inapplicable and allow Macris to enforce its judgment and seek its damages from 
Neways and the Mowers. 
Also, application of res judicata is not necessary to prevent inconsistent 
decisions. Macris prevailed in the Images action. The only rights or interests 
established in that suit were Macris' right to relief stemming from Images' breach of the 
Autoqualification Agreement. These rights cannot be impaired even if Macris' 
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fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims fail. The rights and interests 
established in the Images action can only be impaired if Macris is precluded from 
enforcing its judgment and asserting its claims against Neways and the Mowers for 
attempting to evade liability. 
Third, it is not Macris' conduct that has forced the parties to incur the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits. That dubious distinction belongs solely to Neways and 
the Mowers. Neways and the Mowers forced Macris to bring its claims against them by 
causing Images to transfer its assets, including the multilevel marketing business, to 
Neways. Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers initially took the position in this suit 
that Macris' current claims were not ripe until the first suit was concluded. They took 
this position while the Images action was still pending and when an amendment of 
Macris' pleading may have been possible. If Neways and the Mowers were truly 
concerned about the cost and burden of multiple litigation, they should not have 
attempted to defeat the judgment and Macris' claims in the Images action and should 
not have taken the position that Macris' current claims were not ripe until the Images 
action concluded. 
In the Images action, Macris did not pursue only part of its claims. Rather, 
Macris sought all "damages resulting from termination of the automatic qualification 
status and of the distributorship." (R. at 192-97.) The rule against splitting a cause of 
action should not apply where a claimant pursued all the relief to which it was entitled. 
The rule against splitting a cause of action is based on the 
salutary policy of preventing a multiplicity of vexatious 
lawsuits and harassment of the defendant. The rule 
presupposes the fact that the plaintiff is consciously acting 
inequitably in suing for only part of his claim, knowing that 
he was unnecessarily bringing vexatious lawsuits against 
the defendant or careless as to whether he was causing 
such vexation. The rule against splitting should not be so 
rigidly applied, however, to produce an injustice and thwart 
the policy on which it was founded. Thus, where the 
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plaintiff is . . . not negligent or [the necessity of a 
subsequent action] was caused by the fraud or fault of the 
defendant, plaintiffs purpose will not be to consciously and 
unreasonably vex or harass the defendant. . . . 
Consequently, the rationale and rule against splitting a 
cause of action will be inapplicable. 
Bolte, 587 P.2d at 814. Because in the Images action Macris was not consciously or 
carelessly suing for only part of its claim, the rule against claim splitting should not 
apply. 
Finally, if anyone has caused a waste of judicial resources in this case, it is 
Neways and the Mowers, not Macris. After Images transferred its assets to Neways, 
Images and Thomas Mower made every effort to erect a wall between Images and 
Neways. Images and Mr. Mower consistently maintained that Images and Neways 
were wholly separate corporations having little or no relationship. Furthermore, when it 
was still possible for Macris to bring its current claims and join Neways in the Images 
action, Neways and the Mowers took the position that such claims were not actionable 
until the Images action ended. Macris should therefore not be faulted for bringing its 
claims against Neways and the Mowers in a separate action. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 
985 F.2d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] critical piece of the puzzle [giving rise to 
plaintiffs later asserted claims] was [defendant's] change of tactics during the lawsuit. 
Without this information, [plaintiff] could not have known that she had a claim."); Pepper 
v. Zions First Natl Bank. N A . 801 P.2d 144, 148-49 (Utah 1990) ("Where the 
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or 
deception practiced on him by his opponent, . . . a new suit may be sustained. . . ."); 
Estate of Covington, 888 P.2d at 678 (holding that party was not barred by res judicata 
when in prior action it relied on opponent's representations that if true would have made 
further litigation unnecessary). 
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Neways and the Mowers' argument in their brief that Maoris' failure to 
assert its current claims in the Images action has led to a waste of judicial 
resources and unnecessary expense cannot be taken seriously. (Brief of 
Appellant at 16.) In this very case, they also argued that judicial resources and 
funds would be wasted if Macris could bring their current claims during the 
Images action: 
continuation of this suit, prior to a final determination of liability in 
[the Images action] would waste judicial resources as well as 
subject the parties to unnecessary litigation expenses. 
(R. at 34 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).) Such inconsistency is illustrative of 
Neways and the Mowers' litigation strategy which itself is the sole cause of 
unnecessary litigation expense and waste of judicial resources. 
Judicial economy and the other policies underlying the res judicata doctrine 
should not be obtained at the price of injustice. The best way to promote the purposes 
underlying res judicata is to remand this case to the trial court and allow Macris the 
opportunity to seek damages from Neways and the Mowers for the additional injuries 
caused by their attempts to evade liability, including punitive damages for intentional 
and fraudulent transfers. 
B. ON THE BASIS OF THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS BEFORE IT, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT NEWAYS WAS LIABLE TO 
MACRIS AS IMAGES' SUCCESSOR. 
An entity which acquires the assets of a corporation will become liable for the 
debts of the transferor 
"when the circumstances surrounding the transaction show that 
the new corporation was created for the purpose of succeeding 
to the business and acquiring the property of the old corporation 
and the manner of acquiring the business and property and the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction are of such a 
character as to warrant the conclusion that it is a mere 
continuation of the former corporation." 
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B&K Distr.. fnc. v. Drake BuiMnq Corp., 654 P.2d 324, 326 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(quoting Oklahoma Title Co. v. Burrus, 44 P.2d 852 (Okla. 1935)); see also R. at 426 
('"Under some circumstances, the transferee may be held liable for the debts of the 
transferor, to wit: . . . where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation or 
reincarnation of the old corporation.'" (quoting Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Similarity 
of Ownership or Control as Basis for Charging Corporation Acquiring Assets of Another 
with Liability for Former Owner's Debt, 49 A.LR. 881, 883 (1973)). 
In this case, the trial court correctly held Neways liable as Images' successor. In 
August, 1992, Neways was incorporated with Thomas Mower as president and his wife, 
Les//e Mower, as vice president Thomas Mower was the founder and president of 
Images. In fact, Neways' officers, directors and shareholders were the same members 
of the Mowers' family who were also the officers, directors and shareholders of Images. 
On the eve of the first trial setting in the Images action, the newly formed Neways 
succeeded to Images' assets, including the multilevel marketing business, all of Images' 
inventory and all of its tangible assets. All of the distributors in the multilevel marketing 
business, with the exception of Macris, were invited to become distributors of the 
business under Neways with the same rank and position. Furthermore, Neways carried 
on the same business as Images using the same facilities, employees, equipment, 
furnishings and product formulations that Images had used the day before the transfer. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in ruling that "as Neways 
consists of substantially the same assets, products, officers, and employees as Images, 
it would seem that Neways is in fact a mere continuation of the same corporation" and 
Neways is liable to Macris as Images' successor. (R. at 425.) 
The trial court's only error with respect to its holding of successor liability was in 
limiting Neways' liability to the judgment against Images in the Images action on the 
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basis of res judicata. As discussed above, res judicata does not apply to any part of 
Maoris' claims for relief. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's holding that 
Neways is liable as Images' successor but reverse the trial court's order to the extent it 
limits Neways' successor liability to the judgment against Images. 
Neways and the Mowers raise a number of arguments in opposition to the trial 
court's finding of successor liability. Each lacks merit. 
First, Neways and the Mowers contend that res judicata bars Maoris' successor 
liability claims. For the reasons stated in the preceding sections of this brief, res 
judicata does not bar any of Macris' claims, including its successor liability claim for 
relief. Moreover, res judicata is especially inapplicable where a party seeks to enforce 
a judgment against a different party. See New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v. Benedict, 877 
P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); see also Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and 
Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 
51 (7th Cir. 1995) ("But a second chance is precisely the point of successor 
liability. . . ."); Julien J. Studlev, Inc. v. Lefrak, 401 N.E.2d 187, 188 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he 
legislatively sanctioned enforcement proceeding contemplates a pre-existing 
judgment."). 
Also, Neways and the Mowers assert that "Neways did not contractually agree to 
succeed to Images' obligation to Macris." (Brief of Appellant at 18.) The trial court, 
however, did not base its ruling on any contractual agreement. Rather it based its 
judgment on the ground that Neways is a mere continuation of Images' business. This 
ground is entirely adequate to sustain the trial court's finding of successor liability. 
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); Koch 
v. Speedwell Motor Car Co., 140 P. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914), modified, 140 P. 600 
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(Cal. Ct. App. 1914); Rj*K Distr., 654 P.2d at 326; Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus. 
662 N.E.2d 595, 599 (III- App. Ct. 1996); Tinio, supra, 49 A.L.R. at 883. 
This Court's decisions in Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Co., Inc.. 
888 P.2d 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), do not stand for a contrary rule. Neither of these decisions dealt 
with whether a transferee was liable for the debts of a transferor because it succeeded 
to the business of the transferor. These cases are therefore inapposite. 
Next, Neways arid the Mowers contend, for the first time on appeal, that Eclat, 
Inc. is Images' true successor and the trial court failed to consider evidence as to 
whether Images or Ecl^t could satisfy the obligation to Macris. (Brief of Appellant at 
19.) Neways and the Mowers should not be allowed to now present evidence that was 
not before the trial court regarding Eclat, Inc. A party may not raise a factual issue for 
the first time on appeal Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers' new contentions are contrary to 
uncontested facts. In both their Answer and Amended Answer, Neways and the 
Mowers admitted that £clat is simply another name for Images. Also, it is 
uncontroverted that Images transferred its multilevel marketing business, its inventory 
and all of its tangible assets to Neways. Thus, Eclat Inc. could not be the true 
successor of Images. 
Also, the trial court most certainly did consider evidence as to whether Images 
could satisfy its obligations to Macris. Following the transfer of assets to Neways, 
Images had no remaining tangible assets. Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers now 
assert that "[t]he remainder of the assets and liabilities were transferred to another 
corporation known as £clat." (Brief of Appellant at 3.) Thus, by their own assertions, 
Images had absolutely no assets to satisfy any judgment or obligation. 
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Neways and the Mowers also argue that the evidence does not support the trial 
court's finding that Neways consists of substantially the same assets, products, officers 
and employees as Images. This argument is another attempt to raise factual issues for 
the first time on appeal. These facts were supported by Neways and the Mowers' 
admissions in their Amended Answer and in Macris' statement of facts in its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. In responding to Macris' 
motion, Neways and the Mowers failed to object or attempt to dispute the facts listed in 
support of Macris' motion. "Thus, because the appellant. . . failed to proffer any 
evidence at the trial level in contradiction to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, [the appellant] will not be permitted to now raise the issue for the first time 
on appeal." Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1342; see Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc., 
761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Finally, Neways and the Mowers argue that a corporation must purchase all 
assets of the old corporation in order to be the successor corporation. (Brief of 
Appellant at 20.) This argument is not only wrong, it is ridiculous. Purchase of 
substantially all the assets of the predecessor is all that is required. Williams v. 
Bowman Livestock Equip. Co.. 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); B&KDistr., Inc., 
654 P.2d at 326. The rule advanced by Neways and the Mowers could lead to illogical 
and unfair results if, for instance, only a minuscule amount of assets remain with the 
transferor. Successor liability could too easily be defeated by such a tactic. C i , Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2) (directing that "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any 
creditor" may be inferred from "transfer. . . of substantially all the debtor's assets" 
(emphasis added)). 
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Because the trial court had ample uncontroverted evidence before it that Neways 
was a mere continuation of Images' business, this Court should affirm its imposition of 
successor liability upon Neways. 
XL CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of Neways and the Mowers and affirm the trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of Macris. Res judicata is not applicable to bar Macris' claims against 
Neways and the Mowers for damages beyond those awarded in the Images action. In 
addition, although the trial court correctly found that Neways was liable to Macris as 
Images' successor, the trial court erred in limiting such liability to the judgment entered 
in the Images action. 
DATED: May 14, 1998. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
D. Frank Wilklns T T"' P * ^ 
Chris R. Hoale v * * - ' g  
Attorneys for Macris & Associates, Inc. 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
46 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on May 14, 1998, two true and correct copies of the 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC. were mailed via first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Allen K. Davis 
150 East 400 North 






Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B.SMITH, Clerk' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T x ^ X ^ / f ^ g 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 7 )" ~ e W 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEW AYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, 
and LESLIE D. MOWER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950400093CN 
DATE: September 19, 1997 
JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and 
Leslie Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(b), filed on or about October 16, 1995, and on Plaintiffs, Macris & Associates, Inc., 
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(a), filed on or about November 14, 1995. The Honorable Howard H. Maetani, 
Fourth District Court Judge, heard oral arguments on January 29, 1996, and stayed rulings on 
the motions before the Court pending a ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals on the appeal of 
a judgment in favor of Macris & Associates and Michael Macris in their lawsuit against 
Images, Inc., the predecessor corporation to Neways, Inc. The Court of Appeals rejected 
every argument raised on appeal and affirmed the judgment against Images, Inc. Dennis K. 
Poole and Andrea Nuffer represent Defendants, Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and Leslie 
Mower. Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan 
B. Wilcox, and Jon V. Harper. This matter has again come before the Court through 
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Ruling, filed on September 3, 1997, by Plaintiffs new counsel, 
1 
433 
Stephen T. Hard of Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson. The Court has reviewed the 
file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and heard oral arguments, and upon being advised 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris"), is a Utah Corporation and at one 
time was a distributor for Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), a Utah Corporation formerly 
engaged in multilevel marketing. See Complaint ffl[ 7, 7, 77. 
On or about August 1989, Macris entered into a distributorship agreement with Images 
and the parties agreed to allow Macris to have automatic qualification of its distributorship, 
and attached this provision to the agreement through the Addendum to Distributor 
Application. See Complaint \ 12. 
Pursuant to the Addendum Agreement, Macris agreed to use its time, marketing 
expertise and contacts to build a downline organization within Images' multilevel program. 
For this commitment, Images agreed to pay Macris at the highest level of Images' marketing 
program for product sales made by the distributors in the Macris downline. See Complaint lfl| 
73, 14. 
On or about March 7, 1991, Macris received a letter from Images claiming that Macris 
was not sufficiently active and suspended the Auto Qualification Agreement, and subsequently 
terminated Macris as an Images distributor. See Complaint % 22. 
On or about April 17, 1991, Macris filed a lawsuit (Civil Case No. 910400358) against 
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Images and Thomas E. Mower for breach of contract, seeking relief in the form of damages 
worth the payments it would have received from Images but for the termination of the 
distributorship agreement See Complaint ^ 23. 
Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), a Utah corporation, engaged in multilevel marketing and 
sale of health and beauty products, was incorporated in Utah on or about August 1992, with 
Thomas E. Mower as president and Leslie Mower as vice-president See Complaint ffl[ 2, 9. 
In early September, 1992, Images transferred substantially all its assets to Neways, 
discontinuing its multilevel marketing business, at which time Neways took over the 
multilevel marketing operation, using the same facilities, with the same employees, selling the 
same products through essentially the same network of distributors. See Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ^ 10; Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ^ 3; Maoris v. Images Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law % 17. 
On or about September 15, 1995, the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Judge Guy 
R. Burningham presiding, entered a Judgment against Images on Macris & Associates' cause 
of action for breach of contract An appeal to this decision was filed on or about February 12, 
1996. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment H 14. 
On or about February 15, 1995, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the court of Judge 
Boyd L. Park, alleging fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego. See Complaint 
ffll 30, 38, 45. 
Based on these causes of action, Plaintiff asks to be awarded: punitive damages, 
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general damages from Thomas E. and Leslie Mower, an Order partially voiding the transfer 
from Images to Neways, and an Order making Thomas E. Mower, Leslie Mower, and Neways 
liable for commissions to Macris had its distributorship also been transferred to Neways. See 
Complaint Prayer for Relief fll,2, 3, 4. 
On or about October 17, 1995, Defendants filed Defendant Neways, Inc. Motion For 
Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary 
Judgment filed on or about October 19, 1995, claiming that res judicata bars the plaintiff from 
recovering on its claims. 
On or about November 13, 1995, Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., filed Plaintiff's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 14, 1995, Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum In 
Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 14, 1995, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. 
Motion for Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 24, 1995, Defendants filed a Memorandum In Opposition To 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 28, 1995, the current action was transferred from Judge Park to 
Judge Howard H. Maetani, pursuant to the 4th District Court's decision to reassign some 
cases. 
On or about December 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum In Support Of 
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Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
Oral arguments were heard on the motions on or about January 29, 1996 in front of 
Judge Maetani. 
A Stay of the Proceedings was entered on or about February 21, 1996, pending the 
completion of all appeals in the previous case. 
On September 3, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Ruling, following the 
completion of all appeals in the previous case. 
n 
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a) and (b), a party against whom a 
claim has been made, may at any time move for a summary judgment in his favor. The 
motion should be granted if ". . . the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/' 
URCP Rule 56(c). 
ra 
ISSUES 
Defendants argue that the current action is barred by res judicata, claiming that the 
three elements have been met, in that; the parties are the same, the claim was or could have 
been presented in the first suit, and that there was a final judgment on the merits. For the 
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sake of this argument, Defendants acknowledge that Neways is in privy with Images, but 
contend that this does not make Neways the alter ego of Images, and that there is no 
successor liability attached to the acknowledgment. 
Plaintiff contends that the elements of res judicata have not all been met, that Neways 
and Images are not the same parties, the claims are such that they should not have been 
brought into the first action, and that as the previous decision is being appealed, there has not 
been a final judgment. However, as Defendants have acknowledged the privity between 
Neways and Images, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment on its claim for successor 
liability as a matter of law. 
IV 
ANALYSIS 
Claims are barred from being litigated by res judicata when the following three 
elements are satisfied: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
A. PRIVITY BETWEEN NEWAYS AND IMAGES 
"The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1978). Neways has acknowledged that there is privity between itself and 
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Images for the purpose of proving res judicata, but denies that this in any way proves 
successor liability. Macris refuses to accept Neways' acknowledgment of privity for res 
judicata, but then uses it to claim successor liability as a matter of law. 
[f it is established that Neways is a "successor in interest of property that is the 
subject of pending litigation to which his transferor is bound" then the transferee is "entitled 
to the benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as [its] transferor . . .." 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982); Golden State Bottling Co. Inc. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973). Thus, as Neways is the successor in 
interest of the property that Images would have used to pay damages to Macris, Neways is 
entitled to argue res judicata to the same extent as Images. 
Although Utah has not yet addressed the issue of generally establishing successor 
liability of corporations, a number of jurisdictions have well established rules in common. See 
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Co., 927 R2d 1128,1131 (10th Cir. 1991) (a 
creditor based his claim against a corporation on successor liability, but the court ruled 
against him because "a prerequisite for the imposition of liability against a corporation as a 
mere continuation of a predecessor is a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, the assets of 
the latter to the former."); Kloberdanz v. Jov Manufacturing Co.. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Co. 
1968) (a company that purchased assets from a liable company was found to be not 
responsible because there was no hint of fraud, the transfer was made for a good 
consideration, and there was no connection between the two companies, such as officers or 
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stockholders); Koch v. Speedwell Motor Car Co.. 140 P. 598 (Cal. App. 1914) (the court 
states that when a new corporation is merely a continuation of an old corporation, the new 
will be held liable for the debts of the old) ; Evanston Insurance Co. v. Luko. 783 P.2d 293 
(Haw. App. 1989) (owners of a liable company formed a new company, but the new company 
was not liable as there was no transfer of assets; the court stated that successor liability 
presupposes a transfer of assets, and its intent is that the "rights of creditors are protected 
against a sale , transfer, or distribution of all the corporate property1 in fraud of their rights. 
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2086 at 914 (1985)." A representation of what the common 
reasoning is behind successor liability is located in 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883: 
The general rule seems to be that where a corporation sells or otherwise 
transfers all of its assets, its transferee is not necessarily liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the transferor. Under some circumstances, the transferee may be 
held liable for the debts of the transferor, to wit: (1) where there is an express 
or implied assumption of liability; (2) where the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger; (3) where the transaction was fraudulent; (4) where 
some of the elements of a purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the 
transfer was without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not 
provided for; or (5) where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation 
or reincarnation of the old corporation. 
In the current action, it would seem that the transfer from Images to Neways would 
result in successor liability based on two of the exceptions. First, if as a result of the transfer, 
Images is unable to meet its obligation to Macris, it would indicate that some of the elements 
of a purchase in good faith were lacking in that the transfer was without consideration 
sufficient to provide for the creditors. In Malone v. Red Top Cab Co.. 60 P.2d 543 (Cal. 
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App. 1936), the court held that in the case where one corporation takes all the assets of 
another corporation without passing any other property or cash to the selling corporation that 
could be used to meet any creditor's claim, the purchaser will be obligated to take 
responsibility for the seller's debts. Second, as Neways consists of substantially the same 
assets, products, officers, and employees as Images, it would seem that Neways is in fact a 
mere continuation of the same corporation. In G. P. Publications. Inc. v. Ouebecor Printing— 
St. Paul. Inc. 481 S.E.2d 674 (N.C.App. 1997), the Court considered several factors in 
determining the applicability of successor liability, including whether there is identity of 
stockholders and directors between two corporations. wThis...encompasses the situation where 
one corporation sells its assets to another with the same people owning both corporations." 
Id. at 680, quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.. 195 B.R. 716, 724 
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (citing U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992). 
Therefore, the court finds that Images and Neways are in privity with one another and 
that the element of res judicata has been met in barring a claim for further damages. 
However, the court finds that Neways does fall into the exceptions to the general rule on 
successor liability, and is responsible for meeting the obligation Images currently owes to 
Macris. 
B. NEWNESS OF CLAIMS BROUGHT IN THE CURRENT ACTION 
In both the previous and the current action, claims have arisen from a single breach of 
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a single contract, and in the first suit, Macris was awarded damages for that breach. Macris 
knew about the creation of Neways before the conclusion of the previous trial, and could have 
asked to include Neways in its earning projections if it felt such action was necessary to 
obtain sufficient relief from the breach of contract. 
Basing a new claim for relief, from a previously adjudicated injury, on different issues, 
will not avoid res judicata. "Seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing 
a different substantive law premise or ground . . . does not constitute the presentation of a 
new claim when the new premise is related to the same transaction or series of transactions 
and accordingly the second action should be held barred." Berry v. Berry. 738 P.2d 246, 248 
(Utah 1987) (quoting from the Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment d (1982)). 
As Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the 
previous action, Macris cannot now present a claim for new damages, based on the fact that 
there was a transfer of assets, when the injury is the same as before. 
Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable wrong extends into the 
future and will be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages awarded by 
the judgment are nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the 
entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against 
a defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his recovery and 
commences a second action to obtain increased damages, the court will hold 
him precluded . . . 
Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment c (1982). 
In National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 382 P.2d 405 (Utah 1963), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, saying: 
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In our judgment it better comports with the orderly processes of justice to 
require the plaintiff to bear the responsibility of pleading, proving and claiming 
the full benefit of whatever character of cause of action he possesses in the 
original action and of being bound thereby, than to allow another trial to come 
upon the same cause of action raising issues which could have been dealt with 
in the original action. 
Because of Macris' knowledge of the transfer of Images' assets to Neways, the issue of 
damages in addition to those previously awarded should have been included in the first action. 
Plaintiff argues that the claims brought forth in the current action are a result of a new 
injury, namely Neways failure to make payments to Macris under the terms of the agreement 
between Macris and Images. It would seem that it is plaintiffs contention that the 
distributorship agreement between the parties continued to exist beyond the date of the breach 
of the contract, and as such, was included in the transfer of assets from Images to Neways. 
In fact, it would not be appropriate for plaintiff to receive damages, that are intended 
to make him whole, for a breached contract and then seek to have that same agreement 
performed. 
Whenever there is a total breach of a contract by one party to it, the other is at liberty to 
treat the contract as broken and desist from any further effort on his part to perform it. In 
other words, he may abandon it and recover, as damages for the breach, the benefits he 
would have received by a full performance. . . . Where a contract is thus abandoned, the 
primary right to further performance of the promise of the other party is discharged and is 
replaced by a remedial right to damages for nonperformance. 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 726. In the suit between Macris and Images, Macris sought 
and was awarded damages for breach of contract. Because of this, Macris must be denied in 
its current attempt to claim that Neways has failed to perform under the same contract for 
11 
which there was already found to have been a breach. 
Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the first 
action, and could have raised question regarding it in that suit. As such, the court finds that 
the second element of res judicata has been satisfied in that the issues in the current suit 
could and should have been brought forward in the previous action. 
C. FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS 
The plaintiff argues that as the first action is being appealed, there has not yet been a 
final judgment. In D'Aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345,351 (Ut App. 1992), the court stated that 
"a judgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal, modified, or set 
aside in the court of rendition.*' Because the judgment in the previous suit has not been 
reversed, this element of res judicata is satisfied. 
V 
DECISION 
As discussed in the above analysis, the court finds that the elements of res judicata 
have been satisfied, thus barring Plaintiffs claims for further damages from Neways as a 
result of ti e breached contract with Images. However, the court also finds that Neways is the 
successor of Images and is liable for the previous judgment against Images. 
Therefore, the court GRANTS Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and 
Leslie D. Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment as to any claim for new damages. 
12 
4 
The court also GRANTS a Partial Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff, Macris & 
Associates, Inc., making Neways, as Images' successor, liable for the previous judgment 
against Images. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is instructed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Decision. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 19th day of September, 1997. 
HOWAWlJi^MAETANI 
Fourth District Court Judge 
cc:\ Dennis K. Poole, Esq. 
Andrea Nuffer, Esq. 
Roger D. Sandack 
Stephen T. Hard 
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25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 1; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-1. 
Uniform Laws. — Other jurisdictions that 
have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was en-
acted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-1-13; it has been 
renumbered and all internal references cor-
rected accordingly under instruction from the 
OflEice of Legislative Research and (Jeneral 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors 
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511. 
Statute of limitations, § 78-12-26(3). 
Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Trans-
fers, § 70A-6-101 et seq. 
Uniform Commercial Code — Sales, § 70A-
2-101 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with 
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the 
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to 
vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securi-
ties are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to 
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, 
controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding 
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the 
securities: 
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(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the 
securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease 
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are 
controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or 
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbank-
ruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the 
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against 
only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or 
person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member 
or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a 
member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person 
in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a 
person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general 
partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(c)(iii); 
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(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member 
or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a 
member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or 
person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the 
debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure 
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security 
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equi-
table process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability com-
pany, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental 
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or 
commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, 
related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the 
common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive 
relationship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset 
or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, 
and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a 
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or 
proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L. added Subsections (a)(v), (b)(vi), (c)(v), and (d), 
1988, ch. 59, § 2; recompiled as C. 1953, redesignated the existing subsection designa-
25-6-2; 1992, ch. 168, § 1. tions accordingly and made other related 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- changes and inserted "limited liability com-
ment, effective April 27,1992, in Subsection (7), pany" in Subsection (9). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Creditors. 
Intent. 
Construction and application. 
This section should be construed with liber-
ality so as to reach all artifices and evasions 
designed to rob the act of its full force and effect 
in preventing debtors from paying the just 
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 R2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Creditors. 
Persons having claim in tort against grantor 
which was not reduced to judgment at time of 
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditors." 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Imputation of insolvency as defam- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
atoiy, 49 A.L.R.3d 163. &» 57(1). 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured 
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made 
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support 
to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a 
reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in 
an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or 
execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of 
the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor 
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact 
substantially contemporaneous. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or 
after transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
(2) lb determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may 
be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor 
had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
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(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably 
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor 
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors, 
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953, § 76-6-511. 
25-6-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assignments. 
Badges of fraud. 
Construction and application. 
Constructive trust. 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Evidence. 
Fair consideration. 
"Good faith" transfer. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. 
Parent and child. 
Taxation. 
Assignments. 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, 
unaccompanied by change of possession, is 
fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or 
subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor 
does not necessarily apply to assignments for 
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking 
possession is circumstance from which fraud 
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. 
Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899). 
Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay 
or defraud creditors depends upon the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, as 
gathered from the badges of fraud present. 
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 
(1942). 
Badges of fraud. 
Although actual fraudulent intent must be 
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its 
existence may be inferred from the presence of 
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud." 
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986). 
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent 
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's 
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the 
perquisites of property ownership after having 
formally conveyed all his interest in the prop-
erty, (2) making a conveyance in anticipation of 
litigation, and (3) making a conveyance to a 
family member without receiving fair consider-
ation. Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1986). 
Construction and application. 
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor 
from paying or securing his honest debts, or 
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his 
creditors by placing his means at their disposal. 
Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 730 
(1898). 
Former § 25-1-11 applied to real and per-
sonal property alike. McGoldrick v. Walker, 838 
P.2d 1139 (Utah 1992). 
Constructive trust. 
A constructive trust was properly imposed to 
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds 
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land, 
which were in excess of the purchase price, had 
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey-
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with-
out notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilk-
inson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Conveyances between near relatives, calcu-
lated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his 
claim against one of such relatives, are subject 
to rigid scrutiny. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 
15 P.2d 1051 (1932). 
The mere fact that the transaction is among 
close relatives does not necessarily mean that it 
is invalid, but the true facts are subject to proof. 
Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 R2d 
959 (1960). 
A note and mortgage executed by son in good 
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which 
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent 
conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Conveyances between close relatives are sub-
ject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that close 
relatives are involved does not render the con-
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to as the dugway road, was a public thor-
oughfare which would provide access to his 
property. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, 
and the State and city appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel 
barred action; (2) because city failed to 
proffer any evidence at trial level in contra-
diction to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, city would*not be permitted to 
raise issue whether road was a public thor-
oughfare for the first time on appeal; and 
(3) genuine issue of material fact was raised 
as to width of road, thereby precluding 
summary judgment on this issue. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
Harold G. SCHAER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
The STATE of Utah, By and Through the 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION, Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake City Corporation, Utah Power & 
Light Company and Lincoln T. Hanson, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Harold G. SCHAER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
The STATE of Utah, By and Through the 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION, Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake City Corporation, Utah Power & 
Light Company and Lincoln T. Hanson, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Nos. 18009, 18081. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 10, 1983. 
Landowner instituted suit claiming 
that certain grade road, commonly referred 
1. Judgment <§=*585(3) 
Since 1967 litigation ending in determi-
nation that no reasonable access existed to 
plaintiff's property and present litigation 
rested on a different state of facts and 
evidence of a different kind of character 
was necessary to sustain the two causes of 
action and evidence of the two causes of 
action related to the status of the property 
in two completely different and separate 
time periods, doctrine of res judicata did 
not apply to preclude plaintiff from main-
taining present cause of action in which it 
was claimed that a certain graded road was 
a public thoroughfare which would provide 
access to the plaintiffs property. 
2. Judgment <s=*720 
Because precise issue of whether dug-
way road was a public thoroughfare was 
not actually raised and litigated in 1967 
litigation, doctrine of collateral estoppel did 
not apply to preclude plaintiff from main-
taining present cause of action in which he 
claimed that dugway road was a public 
thoroughfare which would provide access to 
his property. 
3. Appeal and Error ®=* 170(1) 
Because city failed to proffer any evi-
dence at trial level in contradiction to plain-
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tiff's motion for summary judgment in ac-
tion in which he claimed that dugway road 
was a public thoroughfare which would pro-
vide access to his property, city would not 
be permitted to now raise this issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
4. Judgment o=> 181(15) 
In action in which plaintiff claimed 
that a certain graded road, commonly re-
ferred to as the dugway road, was a public 
thoroughfare which would provide access to 
his property, genuine issue of material fact 
was raised as to width of road, thereby 
precluding summary judgment on this issue. 
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen J. Sorenson, 
Ted L. Cannon, Kevan F. Smith, Roger F. 
Cutler, Judy Lever and Rosemary Richard-
son, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
appellants. 
Calvin L. Rampton and Lawrence J. Jen-
sen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case arose because the plaintiff Ha-
rold G. Schaer and Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion (hereinafter "Salt Lake City") failed to 
reach an agreement regarding the purchase 
of the plaintiffs property for expansion of 
a proposed park. The dispute focuses on 
whether the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel preclude the plaintiff 
from maintaining his present cause of ac-
tion. The plaintiff instituted the present 
suit claiming that a certain graded road, 
commonly referred to as the "dugway 
road," is a public thoroughfare under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-39, which would pro-
vide access to the plaintiff's property. The 
trial court granted the plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, holding that the 
dugway road is a public thoroughfare under 
1. The defendant Lincoln T. Hanson filed a dis-
claimer of any right, title or interest in the 
property or easement which is the subject of 
this litigation. The defendants Salt Lake Coun-
§ 27-12-89 and denied the State of Utah's 
(hereinafter "State") Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff and Salt Lake City 
filed opposing Motions for Summary Judg-
ment claiming, respectively, that the width 
of the dugway road is fifty and twenty-five 
and one-half feet. The trial court granted 
the plaintiff's motion and denied Salt Lake 
City's motion. Both the State and Salt 
Lake City appealed from those rulings, 
which appeals were consolidated for the 
convenience of the parties.1 We affirm in 
part, reverse in part and remand for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. 
Prior to 1967, the plaintiff owned approx-
imately 22.8 acres of property located near 
the mouth of Parley's Canyon in Salt Lake 
County. At that time, there were several 
routes of ingress and egress to the plain-
tiff's land. In July of 1967, trial was held 
in the Third District Court in which the 
State condemned 4.6 of the approximate 
22.8 acres of the plaintiff's property for 
construction of a highway system. The 
condemnation deprived the plaintiff of ac-
cess to his remaining property from the 
north and the west, leaving only a possibili-
ty of access via the dugway road. Thus, in 
the 1967 litigation, the plaintiff contended 
that he was entitled to severance damages 
because his remaining property was effec-
tively landlocked as a result of the condem-
nation. After trial, the Third District 
Court entered the following findings re-
garding the plaintiff's remaining property: 
(a) There is no reasonable access to said 
remainder property which would permit 
the same to be economically and feasibly 
developed in the reasonably foreseeable 
future. 
(b) That a sewage disposal system cannot 
be economically and feasibly designed. 
ty and Utah Power & Light Company have 
monitored the case but have taken no active 
part. 
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(c) That it has lost its advantages of an-
nexation to Salt Lake City, potential de-
velopment as part of the subdivision 
proximate to the Salt Lake Country Club 
and further, has lost its dedicated and 
reserved access way to the north and 
west. 
(d) That it can no longer be reasonably 
and feasibly developed for residential use 
presently or in the foreseeable future. 
(e) That the highest and best use of the 
remainder property is either speculative 
or as a public park. 
Based on its Findings of Fact, the Third 
District Court granted the plaintiff $30,000 
as just compensation for the condemnation 
of the 4.6 acres and $76,755 as severance 
damage to the plaintiff's remaining proper-
ty. 
In 1979, the State was involved in an 
inverse condemnation action brought by 
Harvey Hanson, an owner of property adja-
cent to the plaintiff's remaining property. 
In that action, the State claimed that the 
dugway road was a public thoroughfare. 
The State's assertion was based on an al-
leged public use of the dugway road suffi-
cient to constitute a dedication to the public 
under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. However, 
that case was settled by the parties prior to 
a determination by the court of the State's 
assertion that the dugway road was a public 
thoroughfare. 
The present suit was instituted after the 
plaintiff and Salt Lake City failed to reach 
an agreement regarding the purchase of the 
plaintiff's remaining property for the ex-
pansion of a proposed park. The disagree-
ment between the parties focused on 
whether the plaintiff's property had access 
suitable for residential development by 
means of the dugway road. Thus, the 
plaintiff filed suit requesting a ruling by 
the trial court that the dugway road was a 
highway dedicated to the public use pursu-
ant to U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. The plain-
tiff then filed a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment based on its assertion that the dug-
way road was a public thoroughfare under 
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§ 27-12-89. The State filed an opposing 
Motion for Summary Judgment which did 
not controvert the plaintiff's evidence on 
the issue of a public thoroughfare, but rath-
er argued that the plaintiff's position in the 
1967 litigation precluded him from main-
taining his present cause of action by opera-
tion of the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. Salt Lake City orally 
joined in the State's motion at the time it 
was argued. The trial court denied the 
State's motion and partially granted the 
plaintiff's motion, thereby declaring the 
dugway road to be a public thoroughfare, 
but reserving for trial the issue regarding 
its width. The plaintiff subsequently filed 
another Motion for Summary Judgment 
claiming that the established width of the 
dugway road was fifty feet. Salt Lake 
City countered by filing a Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment claiming that the width of 
the dugway road did not exceed twenty-five 
and one-half feet. The trial court denied 
Salt Lake City's motion and granted the 
plaintiff's motion, establishing the width of 
the dugway road at fifty feet. Both the 
State and Salt Lake City appeal the denial 
of their Motions for Summary Judgment 
and the resulting granting of the plaintiff's 
motions. 
On appeal, the State and Salt Lake City 
advance several points of error. They con-
tend that the trial court erred in denying 
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because of the applicability of the doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In 
addition, Salt Lake City argues that the 
trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment that the 
dugway road is a public thoroughfare be-
cause (1) the finding of a public thorough-
fare was based on controverted evidence 
which is improper for summary judgment 
and (2) the evidence fails to meet the ele-
ments of proof necessary under U.C.A., 
1953, § 27-12-89. Salt Lake City also ar-
gues that the trial court erred in granting 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment on the width of the dugway road 
because its ruling was not supported by the 
evidence. 
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The appellants, the State and Salt Lake 
City, assert that the district court's previous 
finding in the 1967 litigation, that no rea-
sonable access existed to the plaintiff's 
property, implies a finding that the dugway 
road is not a public thoroughfare. Thus, 
the appellants argue that, because of that 
implied finding, the plaintiff's present cause 
of action is barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. On this 
basis, the appellants contend that the trial 
court erred in denying the State's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
There are certain distinctions to be made 
in the application of the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. In order 
to determine which doctrine is to be proper-
ly applied, one must focus on whether the 
second claim, demand, or cause of action is 
different from that of the first: 
In order for res judicata to apply, both 
suits must involve the same parties or 
their privies and also the same cause of 
action; and this precludes the relitigation 
of all issues that could have been litigated 
as well as those that were, in fact, litigat-
ed in the prior action 
Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, 
arises from a ifferent cause of action and 
prevents parties or their privies from re-
litigating facts and issues in the second 
suit that were fully litigated in the first 
suit. 
Searle Bros. v. Searle, Utah, 588 P.2d 689, 
690 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). See also East Mill Creek Water Co. v. 
2. Both the State and Salt Lake City rely on 
Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, Utah, 580 
P.2d 243 (1978), as governing the application of 
the doctrine of res judicata. However, before 
the rules enunciated in the Krofcheck case may 
be applied, the appellants must first overcome 
the threshold determination of whether the 
claims, demands, or causes of action of both 
cases are the same. 
3. Even though the parties use the terms "judi-
cial estoppel" and "collateral estoppel" as if 
they are interchangeable, their arguments ap-
pear to be referring to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. In any event, the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel is not applicable to the present case. 
Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 
(1945); Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 
P. 913 (1930). Accord Cromwell v. County 
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876). 
Thus, it is important to recognize that al-
though the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are closely related, they 
are usually mutually exclusive. Where the 
claim, demand, or cause of action is the 
same in both cases, res judicata applies. 
But where the claim, demand, or cause of 
action is different in the two cases, then 
collateral estoppel is applicable. 
[1] Accordingly, we have determined 
that res judicata is not applicable to the 
present case because it is based on a differ-
ent claim, demand, or cause of action than 
that of the 1967 litigation.2 The two causes 
of action rest on a different state of facts 
and evidence of a different kind or charac-
ter is necessary to sustain the two causes of 
action. Moreover, the evidence of the two 
causes of action relates to the status of the 
property in two completely different and 
separate time periods. Thus, the doctrine 
of res judicata does not apply to preclude 
the plaintiff from maintaining his present 
cause of action. 
We next address the issue of whether 
collateral estoppel is applicable.3 After 
having determined the threshold issue, 
namely, that the present case is based on a 
different claim, demand, or cause of action 
than that of the 1967 litigation, we apply 
four tests which determine the applicability 
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? 
In reference to the general rule of "judicial 
estoppel" or "estoppel by oath," this Court has 
stated that "there is no estoppel where there 
was no reliance and the parties had equal 
knowledge of the facts." Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515, 
132 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1942) (citations omitted). 
The position advanced by the State in the Han-
sen litigation in 1979, clearly demonstrates that 
the State did not in any way "rely" on the 
position advanced by the plaintiff in the 1967 
litigation. Thus, the absence of any reliance 
renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel or es-
toppel by oath inapplicable to the present case. 
SCHAER v. STATE BY & 
Cite as, Utah, 
2. Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? 
. . . [4] Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
Searle Bros. v. Searle, supra, at 691 (cita-
tions omitted). 
The issues of the present case focus on 
whether the first and fourth tests are satis-
fied. "We [must, therefore,] determine 
whether the issues actually litigated in the 
first action are precisely the same as those 
raised in the present action." Wilde v. Mid-
Century Insurance Co., Utah, 635 P.2d 417, 
419 (1981) (emphasis added). See also In re 
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 
P.2d 105 (1958). The 1967 litigation was a 
condemnation action which focused on 
whether the plaintiff's remaining property 
was effectively landlocked. Despite vague 
and indirect references to the dugway road, 
the 1967 litigation never focused on the 
precise issue of whether the dugway road 
was a public thoroughfare under U.C.A., 
1953, § 27-12-89. 
The trial court's findings of fact, set 
forth earlier, do not purport to rule conclu-
sively on the status of the dugway road 
"for all time." They simply express the 
trial court's finding that, in 1967, there was 
no "reasonable," "economical," or "feasible" 
access available for use or development, nor 
was there a likelihood of such in "the fore-
seeable future." One of the uses for the 
land noted by the trial court was "specula-
tive," and there is nothing in its findings to 
preclude another court twelve years later, 
from finding that access is now reasonable, 
economical, and feasible by way of the dug-
way road. In any event, neither the find-
ings nor the judgment entered in the 1967 
case demonstrates that the court considered 
and ruled on the precise issue in this case, 
namely, whether the dugway road met the 
requirements of U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. 
[2] This Court has previously stated 
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
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"does not apply to issues that merely 'could 
have been tried' in the prior case, but oper-
ates only to issues which were actually as-
serted and tried in that case." Internation-
al Resources v. Dunfield, Utah, 599 P.2d 
515, 517 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). Thus, because the precise issue of 
whether the dugway road was a public 
thoroughfare was not actually raised and 
litigated in the 1967 litigation, the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel does not apply to pre-
clude the plaintiff from maintaining his 
present cause of action. See Wilde v. Mid-
Century Insurance Co., supra; Internation-
al Resources v. Dunfield, supra. 
[3] Salt Lake City also claims that the 
trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
question of whether the dugway road is a 
public thoroughfare because (1) the finding 
of a public thoroughfare was based on con-
troverted evidence which is improper for 
summary judgment and (2) the evidence 
fails to meet the elements of proof neces-
sary under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. Salt 
Lake City is correct in its contention that 
summary judgment is improper when the 
facts are controverted. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
56(c). See, e.g., Western Pacific Transport 
Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-op, 
Utah, 597 P.2d 854 (1979); Frederick May & 
Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 
(1962). However, neither the State nor Salt 
Lake City presented any evidence whatso-
ever to contest the facts as presented in the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Rather, the State and Salt Lake City chose 
to rely exclusively on the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the doctrines 
of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Un-
der similar circumstances, this Court has 
stated that: 
[W]here the moving party's evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the 
opposing party fails to proffer any evi-
dentiary matter when he is presumably in 
a position to do so, the courts should be 
justified in concluding that no genuine 
issue of fact is present, nor would one be 
present at trial. 
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Upon a motion for summary judgment, 
the courts ought to recognize, as a mini-
mum, that the opposing party produce 
some evidentiary matter in contradiction 
of the movant's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
Where . . . the materials presented by 
the moving party are sufficient to entitle 
him to a directed verdict [as a matter of 
law] and the opposing party fails either 
to offer counteraffidavits or other mate-
rials that raise a credible issue [of fact] or 
to show that he has evidence not then 
available, summary judgment may be 
rendered for the moving party. 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269-70, 
351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960) (citations omitted). 
See also Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 
585 (1982). Thus, because the appellant 
Salt Lake City failed to proffer any evi-
dence at the trial level in contradiction 
to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Salt Lake City will not be 
permitted to now raise the issue for 
the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Shayne 
v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., Utah, 605 P. 
2d 775 (1980). Because the trial court's 
ruling was supported by the uncontroverted 
facts, we affirm its granting of summary 
judgment on that issue. 
Salt Lake City's final assertion of error 
focuses on Salt Lake City's and the plain-
tiff's opposing Motions for Summary Judg-
ment regarding the width of the dugway 
road. Salt Lake City claims that the trial 
court erred in granting the plaintiff's mo-
tion because the evidence does not support 
the plaintiffs contention that the estab-
lished width is fifty feet 
In granting the plaintiff's motion, the 
trial court apparently relied on the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City § 42-7-5 
(1975), as establishing the width of the dug-
way road at fifty feet as a matter of law. 
This reliance was misplaced. That ordi-
nance merely sets forth the minimum stan-
dards and requirements regarding the 
widths of streets in a proposed subdivision 
plan. It does not address the reasonable 
and necessary width of a highway dedicated 
to the public under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-
89. However, even though that ordinance 
does not establish the width of the dugway 
road as a matter of law, it may be offered 
as evidence of what is considered reasona-
ble and necessary under the circumstances. 
[4] Both Salt Lake City and the plain-
tiff cite the proper rule that: "[generally, 
the width of a public road is determined 
according to what is reasonable and neces-
sary under all the facts and circumstances." 
Memmot v. Anderson, Utah, 642 P.2d 750, 
754 (1982) (citations omitted). However, 
both parties fail to agree as to what is 
reasonable and necessary. Salt Lake City 
offered evidence that the width did not 
exceed twenty-five and one-half feet. The 
plaintiff, on the other hand, offered evi-
dence that the width was fifty feet. This 
Court has previously stated that: "p]n con-
troversies like this the width of the high-
way presents a question of fact . . . . " 
Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341,351, 44 P. 
1032, 1033 (1896). See also Leo M. Bertag-
nole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, Utah, 
639 P.2d 211 (1981) (as illustrative of the 
factual nature of the width of dedicated 
highways). The parties offered conflicting 
evidence, which raises a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the width of the 
dugway road and precludes summary judg-
ment. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). See, e.g., 
Western Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive 
State Agricultural Co-op, supra; Frederick 
May & Co. v. Dunn, supra. Thus, the 
granting of summary judgment on this is-
sue was error. 
The judgment of the trial court is there-
fore affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. No costs awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
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is one of fact and not of law. Robinso^ 1 
v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah, 520, 109 P. 81f-
Tested by these rules, we conclude that the 
cient to be submitted to the jury, and th#t 
the court erred in directing a verdict for the 
plaintiff, for which the judgment must be 
reversed. 
[8, 9] As a new trial must be had, it is 
proper here to consider another question pre-
sented by appellant McCornick. The trnU 
court sustained objections to McCornick's 
offer to prove that he delivered his assign-
ment of the 80,000 shares of United States 
Fuel stock to Livingston upon condition th£t 
Livingston would deliver it to the plaintiff 
in payment of Livingston's personal oblige I 
tions at the bank including the note sued up-
on, and upon which McCornick was also li&- ! 
ble. It is not claimed that the plaintiff had j 
knowledge or notice of this condition, in 
excluding the evidence we perceive no error* 
The only issue was payment. And whether 
or not the note in question was paid depends \ 
upon the contract between Livingston and j 
the plaintiff, in the making of which McCof- j 
nick did not participate at all. Assuming 
the excluded evidence to be true, it could not 
affect or control the agreement made by 
Livingston and the plaintiff as to what notes 
were to be discharged. Neither was the evi-
dence admissible upon the theory that Liv-
ingston was the agent of the plaintiff in ob-
taining the assignment from McCornick. A 
debtor is not the creditor's agent in procur-
ing security for the debt. Campbell v. Mur-
ray, 62 Ga. 86; Helmes v. Wayne Agricul-
tural Co., 73 Ind. 325, 38 Am. Rep. 147; 
Wheeler v. Barr, 7 Ind. App. 381, 34 N. 15. 
591; Carter v. Goff, 141 Mass. 123,5 N. E. 471; 
Hyatt v. Zion, 102 Va. 909, 48 S. E. 1; Wood-
ward v. Bixby, 68 N. H. 219, 44 A. 298. 
[10, 11] The appellant McCornick urges the 
further question that, on account of the re-
lease by the bank of the shares of stock in 
the irrigation company which had been pledg-
ed to secure the payment of Livingston's notes 
to the plaintiff, he, as an indorser, who was 
only secondarily liable, was thereby discharg-
ed from liability. Assuming, but not decidingf 
that such claim is available to appellant un-
der the Negotiable Instruments Law, the 
plea must fail, because there was no showing 
whatever of the value of the securities sur-
rendered. It appears that in consideration of 
the release of the irrigation stock Livingston 
supplied additional securities consisting of 
his interest in the 80,000 shares of United 
States Fuel stock. There was no attempt to 
prove, and it cannot be inferred from the 
evidence, that McCornick suffered any injury 
from the transaction. This plea, when other-
wise made out, only goes to a discharge pro 
tanto to the extent of the impairment of the 
securities. State Bank, etc., v. Michel, 152 
Wis. 88,139 N. W. 748,1131; Citizens' Bank & 
T. Co. v. Knox, 187 N. C. 565, 122 S. E. 301; 
Interstate Trust & Banking Co. v. Young, 135 
La.. 46S, S5 &Q. 011 •, FraLte* ^. Rta& Start.. 
Bank, 2 Ohio App. 159. 
The judgment is reversed, and the cause 
remanded for a new trial; appellants to re-
cover costs. 
THURMAN and STRAUP, JJ., concur. 
GIDEON, J., did not participate herein. 
FRICK, J., died before announcement of 
decision. 
BADGER v. BADGER. (No. 4482.) 
(Supreme* Court of Utah. March 21, 1927.> 
1. Divorce <§=3245(3)—Wife, If dissatisfied 
with decree of property settlement, had rem-
edy by motion for new trial or by appeal, not 
by new petition. 
After decree for divorce, remedy of wifer 
if dissatisfied with court's determination of her 
petition to modify decree affecting property, was 
either DY motion for new trial or appeal from 
j decision; and hence she could not disregard | judgment and proceed by new petition to again 
try issues theretofore heard and determined. 
2. Action <©=»53(D— Party having one entire 
demand cannot split it Into separate causes of 
action. 
A party having one entire demand cannot 
split it up into separate causes of action. 
3. Judgment <§=3592—If party by accident, neg-
lect, mistake, or fraud, splits single cause of 
action, adjudication thereon does not bar suit 
on the other. 
While generally party cannot split single de-
mand into separate causes of action, if by ac-
cident, excusable neglect, mistake, or fraud 
of his adversary, and without pleader's fault, he 
splits single cause of action, adjudication in 
respect to one will not bar suit on the other. 
4. Divorce <©=>245(3)— Rule against splitting/ 
of cause of action applies to petition, where-
single ground of complaint is relied on for 
modification or change in judgment. 
Rule against splitting a cause of action ia 
complaint held to apply to petition for modifica-
tion of a divorce decree wherein single ground 
is relied on for modification or change in judg-
ment entered.* 
5. Pleading <§=>360(4)—Motion to strike a 
pleading will be granted only in clear case. 
Courts do not look with favor upon the 
striking of pleadings, and motion to strike will* 
be granted only in clear case. 
6. Pleading <§=>352—Generally, pleading should1 
not be stricken If susceptible of amendment. 
Generally, a pleading should not be stricken 
if it is susceptible of being amended so as to 
*Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah, 456, 154 P . 952; Chaffe* 
v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. 
Rockwood, 65 Utah, 261, 236 P. 457. 
@=3For other cases see same topic and KEY-DUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
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constitute either a cause of action or a de-
fense. 
7. Divorce <§==>245 (3) —Wife's petition to mod-
ify decree held properly stricken, where she 
had had hearing on matters complained of 
therein. 
Wife's petition for modification of divorce 
decree awarding property to her held properly 
stricken, where she had had hearing on mat-
ters complained of therein and pleaded no facts 
which constituted legal excuse for her failure 
to set them out in first petition for modifica-
tion. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; Ephraim Hansen, Judge. 
Action by Ralph A. Badger against Norma 
D. Badger. Decree of divorce for defendant 
on her cross-complaint From order striking 
defendant's amended petition to modify de-
cree, defendant appeals. Affirmed. 
Willard Hanson and A. H. Hougaard, both 
of Salt Lake City, for appellant 
Badger, Rich & Rich, of Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
HANSEN, J. The plaintiff brought this ac-
tion against the defendant in the district 
court of Salt Lake county for the purpose of 
securing a decree of divorce from the defend-
ant. The plaintiff and the defendant have 
been married a little less than two years and 
there are no children issue of the marriage. 
Various acts of cruelty are alleged by the 
plaintiff as a basis for the relief prayed. 
The defendant filed an answer denying any 
acts of cruelty on her part. She also filed a 
cross-complaint wherein
 tshe alleges that the 
plaintiff has been guilty of various acts of 
cruelty towards the defendant She further 
alleges that the plaintiff owns real and per-
sonal property of the value of $100,000 or 
more, that the property owned by plaintiff 
consists of the Oxford Apartments, situated 
at 119 West North Temple street, the Roselyn 
Apartments, situated at 853 South Fourth 
East street, a double house situated at Nos. 
1072 and 1074 East Seventeenth South street, 
all in Salt Lake City, Utah, and also certain 
large acreage of land situated near Holden, 
in Millard county, Utah; that the personal 
property belonging to the plaintiff includes 
a large stock interest in various corporations, 
among them being Ralph A. Badger & Co. 
and the M t Nebo Marble Company. She al-
so alleged in her, cross-complaint that the 
plaintiff received a salary of $300 per month 
and has a net income in excess of $300 per 
month. In her cross-complaint she prays 
judgment against the plaintiff for a decree 6f 
separate maintenance and an equitable pro-
portion of the property belonging to the plain-
tiff. 
To this cross-complaint plaintiff filed a re-
ply, wherein he denies all acts of cruelty al-
leged by the defendant, except such acts as 
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he alleges were justified under the circum-
stances. 
After the issues were thus joined, the 
plaintiff and defendant entered into an agree-
ment adjusting their property rights in the 
event the court in which the case was pend-
ing should grant a decree of divorce. There-
upon the defendant filed an amended cross-
complaint in which she omits some of the 
alleged acts of cruelty contained iu her orig-
inal cross complaint, and further alleges that 
a property settlement has been had between 
plaintiff .and defendant, and she prays judg-
ment that the property settlement theretofore 
agreed upon be ratified and affirmed by the 
court and that she be granted a decree of di-
vorce. The plaintiff filed no answer or other 
pleadings to the cross-complaint of the de-
fendant. 
The defendant offered evidence in support 
of her cross-complaint, and the court, at the 
conclusion of her evidence, made findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and entered a decree 
of
 # divorce in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff. In the decree she was 
awarded the property provided for in the 
agreement theretofore entered into between 
the plaintiff and defendant. The property so 
awarded to the defendant consisted of a con-
tract for the purchase of the Roselyn Apart-
ments on which there was a balance owing of 
§6,630.97 as of February 1,1926, also a vacant 
lot 37x822 feet adjoining the Roselyn Apart-
ments ; also, $150 cash; rent due from a Mrs. 
Smith in the sum of $25; a court allowance 
for the month of February, 1926, amounting 
to the sum of $112; and an additional sum 
of $300 as attorneys' fee for defendant's at-
torneys. 
The decree of divorce was signed and filed 
on February 23, 1926, and four days there-
after, February 27, 1926, a notice of applica-
tion to set aside the decree of divorce was 
served upon the attorneys for the plaintiff, 
to which was attached a copy of a verified 
petition stating the basis for said motion. 
This petition was filed on March 2, 1926. In 
the petition the defendant sets out that she 
had consented to take* the Roselyn Apart-
ments as the principal settlement of the prop-
erty rights which she was to receive relying 
upon the representation of the plaintiff that 
the income from said property amounted to 
$140 per month, but that this property would 
not rent for to exceed $120 per month; that 
there was a balance due on the contract of 
purchase of said apartments in the sum of 
$6,630.97, payable $100 per month; and that 
if she is compelled to pay the taxes, repairs, 
and insurance, with a rental of only $120 per 
month, she will be unable to pay for the apart-
ment house, and the contract of purchase will 
be forfeited. 
To this petition an answer was filed de-
nying the alleged representations, and upon 
these issues a hearing was had, and the court 
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modified the decree of divorce, to the effect i 
that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant 
an additional $120, but otherwise the decree 
of divorce would remain in full force and ef-
fect. The hearing was had on March 4, 1926, 
and the modification of the decree was signed 
by the trial judge on March 10, 1926, and 
filed with the clerk on the day following. 
On March 16, 1926, the defendant filed an-
other petition for a modification of the de-
cree of divorce, in which other counsel ap-1 
peared as her attorneys, and under date of I 
May 22, 1926, by leave of court, an amended 
petition was filed by the defendant. This pe-
tition refers to and makes the original eross-
comp^int of the defendant a part of the pe-
tition and sets forth that the acts of cruelty 
alleged in such original cross-complaint are 
true. It is also alleged that at the time of 
filing the cross-complaint the plaintiff was 
the owner of the property therein mentioned 
and set out; that the Oxford Apartments ; 
were worth from $30,000 to $50,000; that the 
propertv situated at Seventeenth South and 
Eleventh East streets was of the value of $10,-
000; the equity of the plaintiff in the Roselyn 
Apartments was of the value of $1,500; the 
Millard county property was worth $3,000; 
that the plaintiff was the owner of a large 
amount of stock in the Ralph A. Badger & 
"Co., and the same was of great value; that 
he received a salary of at least $300 per 
month; and that he was in receipt of at least 
the sum of $800 per month and was able to 
provide for the defendant according to her 
station in life. I t is also alleged that there 
was owing upon the contract for the purchase 
of the Roselyn Apartments $6,600; that the 
rents derived therefrom did not exceed $120 
per month; that $100 per month must be paid 
on the contract of purchase; that petitioner 
is unable to pay the sum of $100 per month in 
addition to the expenses of repairs, insur-
ance, taxes, and other items of expense; and 
that unless she is granted additional relief she 
will lose the apartment house by forfeiture of 
the contract of purchase. The defendant 
further alleged that at the time the property 
settlement was had the plaintiff gave to her 
then attorneys a statement of his financial 
condition and his property, from which it 
was made to appear that the plaintiff was 
not abte to pay the defendant any alimony; 
that said statement was false, in that the 
plaintiff was the owner of the property above 
mentioned; that the plaintiff further repre-
sented that the rentals of the Roselyn Apart-
ments amounted to the sum of $140 per 
month and that they were in a good state of 
repair, and that the indebtedness owing on 
the contract of purchase was the sum of $6,-
000, Vhich said representations were false; 
that these false representations were so made 
with the intention that they should be acted 
upon by the defendant. I t is also alleged that 
her then counsel, relying upon these false 
statements, informed her that they were un-
able to get a property settlement except the 
one that was later executed by the parties 
herein. I t is also alleged that she informed 
her counsel that she would not consent to the 
proposed property settlement unless she re-
ceived, in addition to the property mentioned, 
at least a few thousand dollars, and suggest-
ed $5,000 in cash. I t is also alleged that she 
signed the property settlement and the 
amended cross-complaint for a decree of di-
vorce, but that she did so in the courtroom 
while in an excited and abnormal state of 
mind, and did not then and there fully un-
derstand or appreciate her rights in connec-
tion with said divorce proceedings and did 
not understand that she was not to receive an 
additional $5,000. It is also alleged that the 
court was not fully advised of the cruel and 
inhuman treatment that she had received 
from the plaintiff, and if the court was fully 
advised in regard to such treatment the court 
should and would grant her a more favorable 
property settlement. Nowhere in the amend-
ed petition is there any allegation to the ef-
fect that she was not fully advised of the 
matters complained of by her in such amend-
ed petition at the time she fi'ed her first pe-
tition for an amendment of the decree of di-
vorce. The defendant in her amended peti-
tion prays judgment that the decree of di-
vorce be vacated and set aside; that the al-
leged contract of property settlement be can-
celed and declared void; that the cause be 
set down for trial on her original answer and 
cross-complaint; that she be allowed a fair 
and reasonable amount of plaintiff's prop-
erty, $200 per month as permanent alimony, 
and a reasonable sum for counsel fees and 
suit money, and for general relief. 
To the amended petition the plaintiff filed 
a general and special demurrer and also a 
motion to strike the amended petition upon 
the grounds, among others, that said petition 
is sham, irrelevant, and redundant, and that 
the amended petition is in all material re-
spects the same as the petition filed on Feb-
ruary 27, 1926, and upon the further ground 
that the court was without jurisdiction to en-
tertain the petition. 
After arguments of respective cobnsel on 
the demurrer and motion to strike, the court 
I entered its order striking the amended peti-
tion on the ground that the cause of action 
set forth in said amended petition has in all 
essential particulars been heretofore present-
ed and petitioner has had her day in court 
and should have presented at one time all of 
the grounds claimed by her a t the time she 
filed her petition on February 27, 1926, and 
also that there are no new matters alleged in 
said petition as having occurred since the en-
tering of the original decree herein. I t is 
I from this order striking the amended peti-
tion that the appeal to this court is prosecut-
ed, and the appellant assigns as error the 
granting of the motion to strike the amended 
I petition for a modification of the decree of 
Utah) BADGER v 
(254 
divorce and the denial of appellant's right to 
be heard upon the merits of her amended pe-
tition thus stricken. 
[1] As to the Koselyn Apartments, the rec-
ord shows that the same matters which are 
set out in the amended petition which was 
dismissed were also set out in the flrst peti-
tion filed for the purpose of securing an 
amendment of the decree of divorce, upon 
which first petition a hearing was had and a 
modification of the decree of divorce was 
granted, except that the first petition did not 
recite that the plaintiff misrepresented the 
amount of indebtedness upon the contract of 
purchase of the Roselyn Apartments. The 
contract of property settlement signed by the 
parties hereto, however, does set forth that 
there was $6,630.97 still Owing on the con-
tract of purchase of the Roselyn Apartments 
as of February 1, 1926, and therefore the de-
fendant must have known that this, indebted-
ness existed against the property at the time 
the hearing was had and the divorce granted 
and also at the time she filed her first peti-
tion for an amendment of the decree of di-
vorce. Defendant having had one hearing up-
on her grievances with respect to the Roselyn 
Apartments, she, of course, is not entitled to 
another hearing upon the same matter. If 
she were dissatisfied with the court's deter-
mination of these matters, her remedy was 
either by a motion for a new trial or by an 
appeal from the decision rendered. She, of 
course, could not totally disregard the judg-
ment then rendered and proceed to again try 
by a separate pleading the issues theretofore 
heard and determined. 
[2] I t is a well-settled rule of law, under 
both common-law and the Code system of 
pleading, that a party having one entire de-
mand cannot split the demand up into sepa-
rate causes of action. 1 Sutherland, Code 
Prac. & Forms, § 218; Cooley v. Calaveras 
County. 121 Cal. 4S2, 53 P. 1075; U. S. v. 
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 65, 25 L. Ed. 93; 1 C. 
J. 1006; 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 
204. In fact, as stated^ in the case of U. S. 
v. Throckmorton, supra: 
"There are no maxims of the law more firmly 
established or of more value in the administra-
tion of justice than the two which are designed 
to prevent repeated litigation between the same 
parties in regard to the same subject of con-
troversy, namely: Interest reipublicae, ut sit 
finis litium, and nemo [debet] bis vexari pro 
una et eadem causa." 
[3] To this well-established general rule, 
however, there are exceptions. If a person 
by accident, excusable neglect, or mistake, or 
by fraud on the part of his adversary and 
without any fault of the pleader, splits a 
single cause of action, an adjudication in re-
spect to one will not bar a suit upon the oth-
er. 1 Van Fleet's Former Adjudications, 206; 
1 C. J. 1009, and cases there cited. If, how-
ever, the pleader is in possession of the means 
of ascertaining the full extent of his claim, 
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and his failure to do so is due to his own fault 
or neglect, it would seem that upon both prin-
ciple and authority the general rule against 
splitting applies. Macon, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
Gerrard, 54 Ga. 827. 
[4] In this case it is clear that the matters 
complained of by the defendant in her last 
amended petition constitute a single cause of 
action, namely, the alleged misrepresenta-
tion of the plaintiff as to his inability to 
make a more favorable property settlement 
with the defendant than the one actually en-
tered into. I t affirmatively is made to appear 
that at the time tne first petition was filed for 
a modification o** the decree of divorce the de-
fendant knew the contents of said decree and 
that she was to receive no property except 
that actually awarded to her. In the amend-
ed petition which was stricken there is no al-
legation that she did not have the same 
knowledge about plaintiff's property and in-
come at the time she filed her first petition 
that she had at the time she filed the strick-
en amended petition. Indeed, at the time she 
filed her first cross-complaint she alleges that 
the plaintiff was the owner of the same prop-
erty and in receipt of the same salary and in-
come as is again set out in the amended pe-
tition. Of course, it may be that the plain-
tiff by false and improper representations 
convinced the defendant that these claims 
made by her in her original cross-complaint 
were not true and that she is therefore en-
titled to have this matter again heard. In 
this case, however, in so f a» as is made to ap-
pear in the amended petition which was 
stricken, the appellant had as much knowl-
edge about the plaintiff's property and income 
at the time she filed her first petition as she 
had at the time she filed the amended peti-
tion which was stricken. The reasons that 
form the basis for the rule against splitting 
the cause of action in a complaint must of 
necessity apply with equal force to a petition 
wherein a single ground of complaint is re-
lied upon for the modification or a change in 
a judgment theretofore made and entered. 
There is complaint made in the petition 
stricken that the appellant omitted from her 
second cross-cornplaint some of the acts of 
cruelty committed upon and towards her by 
the plaintiff, but she doubtless knew these at 
the time she filed her second cross-complaint 
and also at the time she filed her first petition 
for an amendment of her decree of divorce, 
and in any event it is very doubtful whether 
these matters have any bearing upon the 
amount of property to which she is entitled, 
in the absence of any claim that the omitted 
alleged acts of cruelty affected her health or 
earning capacity. 
Counsel for appellant seems to contend that 
thQ well-recognized rule against splitting a 
cause of action does not apply to a divorce 
proceeding. We are unable to see any good 
reason why a husband and wife should be 
given any more latitude in continuing their 
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controversies in court than other litigants, 
except in those cases permitted by our stat-
ute and under facts showing changed condi-
tions, as held by this court in the cases of 
Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah, 456, 154 P. 952; 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah, 261, 225 P. 76; 
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah, 261, 236 P. 
457. In this case there is no claim made that 
there are any changed conditions coming 
within the rules laid down in the above 
cases. 
From what has been said it follows that the 
amended petition which was ordered stricken 
does not allege sufficient facts to warrant the 
trial court in granting the defendant any fur-
ther or additional relief. I t is conceivable, 
however, that the defendant might have al-
leged and shown sufficient facts to have en-
titled her to a hearing and relief in the trial 
court upon those matters that were not heard 
and determined upon the first petition for an 
amendment to the decree of divorce. This 
brings us to the question of whether or not 
the trial court committed prejudicial error 
in striking the amended petition. 
[5-7] I t is a well-settled rule of law in 
most, if not all, jurisdictions that courts do 
not look with favor upon the striking of 
pleadings, and a motion to strike a pleading 
will be granted only in a clear case. 31 Cyc. 
616, and cases there cited. Generally, a 
pleading should not be stricken if it is sus-
ceptible of being amended so as to constitute 
either a cause of action or a defense. In this 
case we are not prepared to hold, and we do 
not hold, that the facts are such that the de-
fendant as a matter of law could not prop-
erly have amended her amended petition in 
such a way as to entitle her to a further 
hearing upon the matters not disposed of in 
her first petition for a modification of the de-
cree of divorce; but we do hold that the facts 
alleged in the amended petition ordered 
stricken did not entitle her to a further hear-
ing, and for the reason that it affirmatively 
appears that the appellant has had a hearing 
upon some of the matters complained about in 
her amended petition, and upon other matters 
complained of, no facts are pleaded which 
constitute a legal excuse for her failure to 
set them out in her first petition for a modifi-
cation of the decree of divorce. Had the ap-
pellant herein desired to further amend her 
petition in the trial court, she doubtless 
would have been granted leave to amend, or 
if such leave had been refused, such refusal 
may well have been prejudicial error. I t is 
not made to appear, however, either in the 
trial court, or this court, that the appellant 
desires to amend the petition stricken or that 
the same could, under the facts, be amended 
to entitle the defendant to any further re-
lief for the reasons above set forth. Upon the 
record in this case the appellant stands in 
the same position that she would have been in 
had the general demurrer been sustained, and 
upon appellant refusing to further plead the 
petition dismissed. Such proceeding would 
have been more in accord with the practice 
of this and most other jurisdictions, unless 
indeed counsel for appellant stated to the 
trial court a t the time of the argument that 
they did not intend to amend the petition 
which was stricken. 
In any event, it is not made to appear that 
appellant was prejudiced by the striking of 
the amended petition, and therefore it fol-
lows that the order striking the amended pe-
tition of the defendant should be and the 
same is affirmed. Respondent to recover his 
costs. 
THURMAN, O. J., CHERRY and STRAUP, 
JJ., and McCREA, District Judge, concur. 
FRICK, J., absent on account of illness 
when submitted, and died before announce-
ment of decision. 
STATE v. ARREGUI. (No. 4704.) 
(Supreme Court of Idaho. March 26, 1927.) 
I. Criminal law <§=>394—Vaiidity of warrant 
and search may be raised by motion to sup-
press evidence at trial (Const. U. S. Amend. 
4; Const. Idaho, art. I, § 17; C. S. Idaho, § 
2637, and § 9456, subd. 6). 
Validity of warrant and search, under 
Const. U. S. Amend. 4, and Const. Idaho, art. 
1. § 17, may properly be tested by motion to 
suppress evidence at the trial, since, in view of 
C. S. § 2637, and section 9456, subd. 6, no 
independent action could be maintained to se-
cure fruits of illegal search and seizure, and 
refusal to permit motion to suppress evidence 
would operate to deny raising question of vio-
lation of constitutional rights, 
2. Constitutional law <@=^ 35—Rules of expedi-
ency must not be placed above Constitution. 
Law and court made rules of expediency 
must not be placed above the Constitution. 
3. Intoxicating liquors <§=>244—State law rel-
ative to search and seizure held applicable to 
search under federal warrant, where evi-
dence was turned over to state officer (C. S. 
§ 2637). 
C. S. § 2637, providing for search and sei-
zure under state prohibition laws, held applica-
ble to search made under authority of purport-
ed federal search warrant, where evidence 
seized thereunder was turned over to state offi-
cers. 
4. Intoxicating liquors <§=^248—Affidavit for 
search warrant, stating affiant had informa-
tion that liquor was sold and knowledge of 
defendant's reputation as liquor dealer, in-
sufficient (Const. U. S. Amends. 4, 5; Const. 
Idaho, art. I, §§ 13, 17). 
Affidavit by federal prohibition agent for 
search warrant to effect that he had been in-
formed that liquor was sold on certain prem-
ises, and that he knew defendant had reputa-
tion of dealing in liquor, held insufficient, under 
^»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexea 
TabF 
ESTATE OF COVINGTON v. JOSEPHSON Utah 675 
Cite as 888 P.2d 675 (UtahApp. 1994) 
trial court to award Industrial its reasonable 1. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1) 
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
 B e c a u g e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t presents 
only questions of law, Court of Appeals ac-
BENCH and WILKINS, JJ., concur. cords no deference to trial court's ruling and 
reviews it for correctness. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
The ESTATE OF Douglas B. COVING* 
TON, By and Through its Co-Personal 
Representatives, Robert H. COVING-
TON and Mary C. Whetman, Plaintiffs 
and Appellees, 
v. 
John C. and Geraldine C. JOSEPHSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 930371-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 22, 1994. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1995. 
Vendors sued purchasers, seeking re-
payment of property taxes and water assess-
ments that vendors made on property in 
question. Purchasers moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that action was precluded 
by vendors' prior action against purchasers, 
which resulted in judgment awarding pur-
chasers title to property. Vendors also 
moved for summary judgment. The Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Robin 
W. Reese, J., granted vendors' motion for 
summary judgment. Purchasers appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held 
that: (1) neither res judicata nor collateral 
estoppel was applicable, and (2) vendors' at-
torney's undisputed affidavit supported 
award of attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
Davis, J., issued opinion concurring in 
result. 
2. Judgment 0 6 3 4 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 
prevents relitigation of issues that have once 
been litigated even though claims for relief 
may be different. 
3. Judgment e=>634 
Whereas res judicata prevents relit-
igation of identical causes of action or de-
mands, collateral estoppel disallows relit-
igation of issues. 
4. Judgment <3>720 
Vendors were not collaterally estopped 
from suing purchasers to recover taxes and 
water assessments vendors paid on property, 
even though purchasers had, in vendors' ear-
lier suit against purchasers, asked for and 
received finding that contract for purchase of 
property in question had been paid in full; 
there was no evidence that taxes and assess-
ments were actually litigated in prior action. 
5. Judgment ®=»713(2), 739 
Neither res judicata nor collateral estop-
pel precluded vendors' action against pur-
chasers to recover taxes and water assess-
ments that vendors paid on property con-
veyed, even though purchasers, in vendors' 
prior action against purchasers, asked for 
and received finding that contract for pur-
chase of that property had been paid in full; 
vendors had no reason to bring claim for 
taxes or assessments in prior action, as pur-
chasers represented during trial that they 
would pay any taxes and assessment regard-
ing property, and any claim for reimburse-
ment of taxes and assessments would not 
have been ripe for adjudication during prior 
action, as vendors did not pay taxes and 
assessments until well after completion of 
that action. 
6. Appeal and Error <5^ 241 
Raising issue in posttrial motion does 
not preserve that issue for appeal. 
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7. Costs <s=>208 
Trial courts are not required to make 
specific findings regarding attorney fees 
where all relevant facts are undisputed; un-
disputed relevant facts supporting such 
award include unrebutted affidavit. 
8. Costs e=>207 
Plaintiffs' attorney's undisputed affidavit 
was sufficient to support award of attorney 
fees to plaintiffs. 
Gordon A. Madsen, North Salt Lake, for 
appellants. 
David K. Broadbent, Salt Lake City, for 
appellees. 
Before DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendants, John C. Josephson and Geral-
dine C. Josephson (the Josephsons), appeal 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff, the Estate of Douglas B. 
Covington, by and through its co-personal 
representatives, Robert H. Covington and 
Mary C. Whetman (the Estate). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
This appeal arises from a second lawsuit 
involving a real property transaction. Doug-
las and Alice Covington sold a tract of real 
property located in Salt Lake County (the 
Property) and five shares of water stock to 
the Josephsons pursuant to a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract dated May 4, 1973 (the Con-
tract). 
Douglas Covington and John Josephson 
subsequently entered into a written adden-
dum to the Contract granting the Josephsons 
a right-of-way to the Property across adja-
cent land owned by the Covingtons. Alice 
1. The Contract states that 
In the event the Buyer shall default in the 
payment of any special or general taxes, as-
sessments or insurance premiums as herein 
provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay 
said taxes, assessments and insurance premi-
ums or either of them, and if Seller elects so to 
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller 
upon demand. 
Covington died in 1981 and Douglas Coving-
ton died in 1987, leaving Robert Covington 
and Mary Whetman as co-personal represen-
tatives of the Estate. 
Sometime in 1989, a dispute arose between 
the Josephsons and the Estate regarding the 
right-of-way. As a result, the Josephson's 
recorded a Notice of Interest asserting their 
rights in the right-of-way. In May 1989, the 
Estate filed the first suit against the Joseph-
sons in Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County seeking to quiet title to the right-of-
way, for damages for slander of title and 
trespass, and for an injunction restraining 
the Josephsons from continued use of the 
right-of-way. The Josephsons counter-
claimed requesting that the court quiet title 
in them to the right-of-way, award them the 
five shares of water stock, and declare that 
the Contract was "fully paid and performed 
by Josephsons, and Josephsons are entitled 
to conveyance" of the Property. 
A bench trial was held before the Honor-
able Richard H. Moffat, who ruled in favor of 
the Josephsons and, in a judgment dated 
December 18, 1991 (Judgment), awarded the 
Josephsons title to the Property, including 
the claimed right-of-way, and awrarded attor-
ney fees. 
Subsequently, on May 8, 1992, the Estate 
paid the property taxes and water assess-
ments for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 on 
the Property and the five shares of water 
stock consistent with the terms of the Con-
tract.1 After demand by the Estate, the 
Josephsons refused to repay the Estate for 
the taxes and assessments paid.2 
On July 7, 1992, the Estate filed a second 
lawsuit in the Third Circuit Court for Salt 
Lake County, seeking to recover the amounts 
it paid for taxes and water assessments and 
attorney fees. Both sides filed motions for 
summary judgment, and, on February 16, 
2. The Estate paid the taxes and assessments on 
the Property because it wished to sell real estate 
it owned adjacent to the Property. Since the 
Estate's and the Josephson's property were joint-
ly assessed by Salt Lake County, taxes and as-
sessments on both parcels had to be paid so that 
the Estate could deliver clear title to the purchas-
er of its property 
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1993, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the Estate. The trial court 
denied the Josephsons' subsequent Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment. This appeal fol-
lowed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
We address the following issues on appeal: 
(1) Is the Estate's action barred by the doc-
trines of res judicata or collateral estoppel? 
(2) Was the Contract terminated by the Dis-
trict Court action so as to preclude a claim 
under it? (3) Were the attorney fees award-
ed to the Estate excessive?3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 
56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment, this court considers "all of the 
facts and evidence presented, and every rea-
sonable inference arising therefrom, in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion." Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 
405, 408 (Utah App.1987). Further, because 
summary judgment presents only questions 
of law, this court accords no deference to the 
trial court's ruling and reviews it for correct-
ness. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation 
Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Mum-
ford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 
1041, 1043 (Utah App.1993). 
ANALYSIS 
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
The Josephsons assert that the Estate's 
action is barred by the doctrine of res judica-
ta and/or collateral estoppel. 
In Schaer v. State ex rel. UDOT, 657 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the elements of res judicata. In 
Schaer, the court stated: 
3. The Josephsons also raise additional issues in-
cluding collateral attack and the existence of 
material facts precluding summary judgment. 
We find these claims lacking in merit and there-
fore do not address them. See State v. Carter, 
"In order for res judicata to apply, both 
suits must involve the same parties or 
their privies and also the same cause of 
action; and this precludes the relitigation 
of all issues that could have been litigated 
as well as those that were in fact litigated 
in the prior action." 
Id. at 1340 (quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). In addition, 
" 'the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits.' " In re J.J.T., 877 
P.2d 161, 163 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Mad-
sen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988)). 
[2,3] Collateral estoppel, or issue preclu-
sion, prevents the relitigation of issues that 
have once been litigated even though the 
claims for relief may be different. Pen rod v. 
Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 
(Utah 1983). Thus, whereas res judicata 
prevents a relitigation of identical causes of 
action or demands, collateral estoppel disal-
lows a relitigation of issues. Schaer, 657 
P.2d at 1340. The elements of collateral 
estoppel include: 
"(1) Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one present-
ed in the action in question? 
(2) Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
(3) Was the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? 
. . . [4] Was the issue in the first case 
completely, fully and fairly litigated?" 
Id. at 1340-41 (quoting Searle Bros, 588 P.2d 
at 691). 
The Josephsons argue that in the first suit, 
they asked for and received a finding from 
the District Court that the Contract had 
been "paid in full." The Josephsons assert 
that because of this finding, any claim for 
payments due under the Contract, including 
a claim for taxes and water assessments, has 
already been litigated and thus is barred by 
res judicata. Further, the Josephsons assert 
that even if res judicata does not apply, 
776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that 
appellate courts "need not analyze and address 
in writing each and every argument, issue, or 
claim raised"). 
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collateral estoppel applies because the "paid 
in full" finding at least shows that identical 
issues were litigated.4 
[4] However, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel only apply where the issue "was 
actually litigated" in the first action, Aragon 
v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 254 n. 
6 (Utah App.1993), or the claim "could and 
should have been raised in the first action." 
Madsen v. BoHhick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988). The Josephsons have failed to pro-
duce any evidence to show that taxes and 
assessments were actually litigated in the 
District Court. Therefore, we find that the 
issue was not "actually" litigated in the prior 
action, thus precluding application of collater-
al estoppel. 
[5] We must next determine if the claims 
"could and should have been raised" in the 
prior action. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. In 
their affidavits, David K. Broadbent, the Es-
tate's counsel, and Mary C. Whetman, one of 
the Estate's co-personal representatives, 
state that prior to trial of the first suit, the 
Josephsons, through their attorney, repre-
sented to the Estate that they would pay any 
taxes and assessments regarding the Proper-
ty. This representation was apparently 
made again during trial. In his affidavit, 
John C. Josephson denies that a "stipulation" 
regarding taxes and assessments was ever 
entered into at trial, but does not deny that 
such representations were made either prior 
to or during trial. Relying upon those undis-
puted representations, the Estate had no 
reason to bring a claim for the taxes or 
assessments in the prior action. 
Moreover, the Estate didn't pay the taxes 
and assessments until May 8, 1992, well after 
the completion of the prior action. Any 
claim for reimbursement of the Estate's pay-
ment of those taxes and assessments was not 
"ripe for adjudication" at the time of the 
4. It appears that the Estate concedes, and we 
agree, that the first action involved the same 
parties and that there was a final adjudication on 
the merits. Thus, the issue narrows to whether 
identical claims or issues were previously litigat-
ed. 
5. We note that in State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
issues raised and dealt with in post-trial eviden-
tiary hearings are preserved for appeal. Id. at 
District Court action and therefore could not 
have been brought. See Andreivs v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 
1992). 
Taxes and water assessments were never 
addressed in the prior action. Further, be-
cause such claims were not then disputed, 
they were not ripe and should not be classi-
fied as ones that "could and should have been 
litigated." Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. Thus, 
the purposes of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel to limit "parties to one fair trial of 
an issue or cause," and further to serve such 
"public interests as 'fostering reliance on pri-
or adjudication, preventing inconsistent deci-
sions, relieving parties of the cost and vexa-
tion of multiple lawsuits,' and 'conserving 
judicial resources/" J.J.T., 877 P.2d at 162 
(quoting Office of Recovery Sews. v. V.G.P., 
845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App.1992)) are not 
present here. Therefore, neither res judica-
ta nor collateral estoppel precludes the Es-
tate's action. 
Termination of Contract 
The Josephsons assert that because the 
District Court ruled that the Contract was 
paid in full, it was thereafter terminated and 
no longer available to support a claim for 
taxes, water assessments, or attorney fees. 
[6] The Josephsons did not raise this is-
sue until their Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment submitted to the trial court after it 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Estate. Raising an issue in a post-trial mo-
tion—or as is the case here, post-summary 
judgment—does not preserve that issue for 
appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 
682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); Beehive Med-
ical Elecs. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861 
(Utah 1983); LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel 
Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 484 (Utah App.1991).5 
265-66. See also State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 
1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (holding that because 
trial judge took evidence on and ruled upon a 
challenge to hearsay evidence at trial—even 
though the objection was not timely raised—the 
issue was preserved for appeal). However, we 
believe Belgard and Matsamas are inapplicable to 
this case. Unlike the situation here, the trial 
court in both cases had the opportunity and 
chose to take evidence and fully hear the argu-
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Thus, we find that this issue was not proper- CONCLUSION 
ly preserved and therefore decline to address 
it.6 The Estates action is not barred by res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. Further, the 
Attorney Fees termination of contract issue is not properly 
The Josephsons next claim that issues of b e f o r e us- Finally, no issues of fact exist 
fact exist precluding summary judgment be- regarding the reasonableness of attorney 
cause the trial court failed to hold an eviden- fees. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
tiary hearing on the reasonableness of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
attorney fees awarded. Estate. 
[7] In Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 
Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that unless the parties 
agree otherwise, a trial court must take evi-
dence of the reasonableness of attorney fees 
and make findings thereon. Id. at 630. See 
also Utah Code Jud.Admin. R4-505 (setting 
forth criteria for affidavits in support of at-
torney fees). However, trial courts are not 
required to make specific findings regarding 
attorney fees where all the relevant facts are 
undisputed, Taylor n Estate of Taylor, 770 
P.2d 163, 168-69 n. 6 (Utah App.1989). Un-
disputed relevant facts supporting an award 
of attorney fees includes an unrebutted affi-
davit. Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker, 537 P.2d 
1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
[8] In this case, the attorney fees award-
ed are supported by the affidavit of David K. 
Broadbent, attorney for the Estate. Based 
on our review of the affidavit, we find that it 
complies with the requirements of Rule 4-
505. Moreover, the Josephsons never dis-
puted the affidavit. Therefore, we find that 
the trial court was not required to take fur-
ther evidence regarding attorney fees. 
ments raised. In Belgard, the trial court granted 
an evidentiary hearing on the issues. Belgard, 
830 P.2d at 265. In Matsamas, the issues were 
heard and ruled upon during trial. Matsamas, 
808 P.2d at 1053. The trial courts thus waived 
the requirements of Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Belgard, 830 P.2d at 266. 
However, in this case, the termination of con-
tract issue was not raised until the Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment. The trial court did 
not take evidence or hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the issue, but instead simply denied the Mo-
tion to Alter or Amend. Thus, the trial judge did 
not "effectively waive[]" the Josephsons' re-
quirement to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. 
6. Even if the issue were properly before us, the 
Estate would still prevail. The Josephsons argue 
that the District Court's ruling that the Contract 
was "paid in full" terminated the Contract and 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
DAVIS, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the majority's result to the 
extent that defendants should be estopped to 
assert defenses of res judicata and/or collat-
eral estoppel because of the representations 
of their counsel in the prior trial, and not 
because res judicata and/or collateral estop-
pel would not otherwise apply to the facts of 
this case. 
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that 
" * "[e]stoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
precludes parties from asserting their rights 
where their actions render it inequitable to 
allow them to assert those rights."'" Dan-
sie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 
1159 n. 10 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Burrow 
v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App. 
1990) (quotation omitted)). The test for de-
termining whether estoppel is present "is 
whether there is conduct, by act or omission, 
by which one party knowingly leads another 
party, reasonably acting thereon, to take 
any rights under it. We disagree with the Jo-
sephsons' characterization of the District Court's 
ruling. In its Judgment, the District Court con-
veyed the Property, the five shares of water 
stock, and the right-of-way to the Josephsons. In 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
court stated that the Contract was "paid in full." 
However, the court did not explicitly state that 
the Contract was terminated. Indeed, it would 
have been improper for the District Court to do 
so since the court did not address other issues or 
provisions under the Contract such as the prom-
ise to pay "all taxes and assessments of every 
kind." The fact that some taxes and assessments 
were due and owing at the time of the Judgment 
is a strong indication that the District Court's 
ruling did not terminate the Contract, but rather 
was limited to the issues discussed. 
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some course of action, which will result in his 
detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct 
or representation." J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975) 
(footnote omitted); accord Triple I Supply, 
Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298, 
1301-02 (Utah 1982). Moreover, 
"[w]here, as here, the delay in commencing 
action was induced by the conduct of the 
party sought to be charged the latter may 
not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery. 
An estoppel may arise although there was 
no designed fraud on the part of the per-
son sought to be estopped. To create an 
equitable estoppel, 'it is enough if the par-
ty has been induced to refrain from using 
such means or taking such action as lay in 
his powrer, by which he might have re-
trieved his position and saved himself from 
loss' 'It is well-settled that a person 
by his conduct may be estopped to rely 
upon these defenses. Where the delay in 
commencing action is induced by the con-
duct of the defendant it cannot be availed 
of by him as a defense/ " 
Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 
P.2d 159, 162 (1969) (quotation and footnote 
omitted). 
Although the court's opinion does not con-
tain an estoppel analysis, it correctly con-
cludes that, based upon undisputed affidavits, 
representations were made by defendants to 
plaintiffs either prior to or during trial to the 
effect that defendants would pay any taxes 
and assessments regarding the property. In 
reasonable reliance on those representations, 
the Estate would have no reason to assert a 
counterclaim for the taxes or assessments in 
the prior action. Having induced the Estate 
to refrain from pursuing a counterclaim for 
taxes and assessments, defendants cannot 
now rely upon the defenses of res judicata 
and/or collateral estoppel. 
In my view, the requirements for res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel set out in the 
court's opinion are present here and, but for 
the equitable estoppel created by defendants, 
would be valid defenses to plaintiffs claim. 
Having determined that those defenses are 
not available to defendant, there is no need 
to consider the issues of whether the court in 
the prior proceeding determined that the 
contract was terminated or whether plain-
tiffs claims were ripe for adjudication. 
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Kirk W. DALL, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, The Utah State Board of 
Pardons, and The Utah State Psychiat-
ric Security Review Board, Respondents 
and Appellees. 
No. 930722-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 27, 1994. 
Patient at state hospital petitioned for 
extraordinary writ following decision of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) 
to transfer his custody from state hospital to 
Board of Pardons, and the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Leslie A. Lewis,.., 
denied petition. Patient appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, Associate P.J., held 
that the record did not support the PSRB's 
determination that patient had received the 
maximum benefit available from treatment at 
the hospital, and thus the transfer of custody 
to the Board of Pardons and resulting con-
finement at state prison were unlawful. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>701 
Mental Health <S=>436.1 
Psychiatric Security Review Board 
(PSRB) is exempt from the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, so 
there is no statutory right of direct appeal 
from its decisions. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
K2)(c). 
